Signaling Fiscal Regime Sustainability:
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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Prati, Alessandro (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 1999
Series:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 99/86
Links:http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
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http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864/06234-9781451850864.xml
Abstract:This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable-but not fully credible-governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger (that is, when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated). At this point, they may deviate from tax smoothing not to be mimicked by weak governments. The model predicts that primary balances and debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating function as tests on Italian, Irish, Belgian, and Danish data show
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
ISBN:1451850867
9781451850864