A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies:
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dabla-Norris, Era (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2000
Series:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 00/106
Links:http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882/00048-9781451852882.xml
Abstract:This paper examines interactions between self-interested agents in a two-tier government hierarchy, consisting of a central authority and bureaucrats in a two-stage game, where the actions of agents affect private sector allocations. Conditions under which lower-tier corruption arises as an equilibrium characterization of the game are identified. If bureaucratic corruption sufficiently reduces the tax base, policies that deter corruption may be optimal. When monitoring is expensive or ineffective, lower-level corruption arises as equilibrium. Tax farming and the sale of offices can occur in these equilibria. In addition, strategic complementarities between bureaucrats may give rise to multiple equilibria
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
ISBN:1451852886
9781451852882