Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies:
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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person: Debrun, Xavier (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2011
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 11/173
Links:http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327/12054-9781462313327.xml
Abstract:Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on ""fiscal councils"" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing ""commitment technologies"" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
ISBN:1462313329
9781462313327