Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns: The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance
In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2009
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Other papers
|
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1596/28159 |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource |
| DOI: | 10.1596/28159 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048268738 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220609s2009 xx o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/28159 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM01045974X | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1334037558 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM01045974X | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Dutt, Pushan |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns |b The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance |c Pushan Dutt |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2009 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Other papers | |
| 520 | |a In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Dutt, Pushan |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mitra, Devashish |4 oth | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/28159 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033648932 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 2819910 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1821937185780137985 |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Dutt, Pushan |
| author_facet | Dutt, Pushan |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Dutt, Pushan |
| author_variant | p d pd |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048268738 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM01045974X (OCoLC)1334037558 (DE-599)GBVNLM01045974X |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/28159 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02450nam a2200337zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048268738</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220609s2009 xx o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/28159</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)NLM01045974X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1334037558</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM01045974X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Dutt, Pushan</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns</subfield><subfield code="b">The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance</subfield><subfield code="c">Pushan Dutt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Other papers</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Dutt, Pushan</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mitra, Devashish</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/28159</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033648932</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048268738 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:40:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033648932 |
| oclc_num | 1334037558 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Other papers |
| spellingShingle | Dutt, Pushan Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance |
| title | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance |
| title_auth | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance |
| title_exact_search | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance |
| title_full | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance Pushan Dutt |
| title_fullStr | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance Pushan Dutt |
| title_full_unstemmed | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance Pushan Dutt |
| title_short | Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns |
| title_sort | explaining agricultural distortion patterns the roles of ideology inequality lobbying and public finance |
| title_sub | The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/28159 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT duttpushan explainingagriculturaldistortionpatternstherolesofideologyinequalitylobbyingandpublicfinance AT mitradevashish explainingagriculturaldistortionpatternstherolesofideologyinequalitylobbyingandpublicfinance |