Do Elected Councils Improve Governance?: Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan
Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not cle...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2013
|
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6510 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (38 p) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-6510 |
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| id | DE-604.BV048265944 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:40:07Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publisher | The World Bank |
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| spellingShingle | Beath, Andrew Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_auth | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_exact_search | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_full | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan Andrew Beath |
| title_fullStr | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan Andrew Beath |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan Andrew Beath |
| title_short | Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? |
| title_sort | do elected councils improve governance experimental evidence on local institutions in afghanistan |
| title_sub | Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6510 |
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