Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects: Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market
Competitive bidding is an important policy tool to procure goods and services from the market at the lowest possible cost. Under traditional public procurement systems, however, it may be difficult to purchase highly customized objects, such as energy efficiency services. This is because not only pr...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2013
|
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6485 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Competitive bidding is an important policy tool to procure goods and services from the market at the lowest possible cost. Under traditional public procurement systems, however, it may be difficult to purchase highly customized objects, such as energy efficiency services. This is because not only prices but also other nonmonetary aspects need to be taken into account. Multidimensional auctions are often used to evaluate multidimensional bids. This paper examines the bidding strategy in multidimensional auctions, using data from public energy service company projects in Japan. It shows that multidimensional auctions work well, as theory predicts. The competition effect is significant. In addition, strategic information disclosure, including walk-through and preannouncement of reserve prices, can also promote energy savings and investment. Risk sharing arrangements are critical in the energy service company market. In particular, the public sector should take regulatory risk |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (49 p) |
| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-6485 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV048265919 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220609s2013 xx o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1596/1813-9450-6485 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010335757 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1334028718 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM010335757 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-19 |a DE-355 |a DE-703 |a DE-91 |a DE-706 |a DE-29 |a DE-M347 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-20 |a DE-739 |a DE-1043 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Iimi, Atsushi |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects |b Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market |c Atsushi Iimi |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 2013 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (49 p) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a Competitive bidding is an important policy tool to procure goods and services from the market at the lowest possible cost. Under traditional public procurement systems, however, it may be difficult to purchase highly customized objects, such as energy efficiency services. This is because not only prices but also other nonmonetary aspects need to be taken into account. Multidimensional auctions are often used to evaluate multidimensional bids. This paper examines the bidding strategy in multidimensional auctions, using data from public energy service company projects in Japan. It shows that multidimensional auctions work well, as theory predicts. The competition effect is significant. In addition, strategic information disclosure, including walk-through and preannouncement of reserve prices, can also promote energy savings and investment. Risk sharing arrangements are critical in the energy service company market. In particular, the public sector should take regulatory risk | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Iimi, Atsushi |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Iimi, Atsushi |a Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6485 |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646113 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 2817140 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1821937172648820736 |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Iimi, Atsushi |
| author_facet | Iimi, Atsushi |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Iimi, Atsushi |
| author_variant | a i ai |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048265919 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010335757 (OCoLC)1334028718 (DE-599)GBVNLM010335757 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1596/1813-9450-6485 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02219nam a2200325zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV048265919</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220609s2013 xx o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1596/1813-9450-6485</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)NLM010335757</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1334028718</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM010335757</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Iimi, Atsushi</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects</subfield><subfield code="b">Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market</subfield><subfield code="c">Atsushi Iimi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">2013</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (49 p)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Competitive bidding is an important policy tool to procure goods and services from the market at the lowest possible cost. Under traditional public procurement systems, however, it may be difficult to purchase highly customized objects, such as energy efficiency services. This is because not only prices but also other nonmonetary aspects need to be taken into account. Multidimensional auctions are often used to evaluate multidimensional bids. This paper examines the bidding strategy in multidimensional auctions, using data from public energy service company projects in Japan. It shows that multidimensional auctions work well, as theory predicts. The competition effect is significant. In addition, strategic information disclosure, including walk-through and preannouncement of reserve prices, can also promote energy savings and investment. Risk sharing arrangements are critical in the energy service company market. In particular, the public sector should take regulatory risk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Iimi, Atsushi</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Iimi, Atsushi</subfield><subfield code="a">Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6485</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646113</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048265919 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:40:07Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033646113 |
| oclc_num | 1334028718 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-703 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-706 DE-29 DE-M347 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-20 DE-739 DE-1043 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (49 p) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Iimi, Atsushi Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market |
| title | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market |
| title_auth | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market |
| title_exact_search | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market |
| title_full | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market Atsushi Iimi |
| title_fullStr | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market Atsushi Iimi |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market Atsushi Iimi |
| title_short | Multidimensional Auctions for Public Energy Efficiency Projects |
| title_sort | multidimensional auctions for public energy efficiency projects evidence from the japanese esco market |
| title_sub | Evidence from the Japanese ESCO Market |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6485 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT iimiatsushi multidimensionalauctionsforpublicenergyefficiencyprojectsevidencefromthejapaneseescomarket |