Basic income or a single tapering rule? Incentives, inclusiveness and affordability compared for the case of Finland:

The combination of different working-age benefits, childcare costs and income taxation creates complexity, reduces work incentives and holds back employment. This paper compares Finland's benefit system with two benefit reform scenarios: a uniform benefit for all ("basic income") and...

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Beteilige Person: Pareliussen, Jon (VerfasserIn)
Weitere beteiligte Personen: Hwang, Hyunjeong (MitwirkendeR), Viitamäki, Heikki (MitwirkendeR)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Paris OECD Publishing 2018
Schriftenreihe:OECD Economics Department Working Papers
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Links:https://doi.org/10.1787/d8c0fbc4-en
Zusammenfassung:The combination of different working-age benefits, childcare costs and income taxation creates complexity, reduces work incentives and holds back employment. This paper compares Finland's benefit system with two benefit reform scenarios: a uniform benefit for all ("basic income") and a universal tapering rule ("universal credit"). The scenarios are modelled in the OECD TaxBen model and the TUJA microsimulation model. We find that replacing current benefits with a basic income would improve incentives for many, but with a drastic redistribution of income and likely increasing poverty as a result. Merging working-age benefits with similar aims and coordinating their tapering against earnings would on the other hand consistently improve work incentives and transparency, while preserving or improving social protection
Umfang:1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)
DOI:10.1787/d8c0fbc4-en