Corporate law and the theory of the firm: reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors
"Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders' property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Abingdon, Oxon
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
2020
|
| Schriftenreihe: | The economics of legal relationships
Economics of legal relationships |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003019770 |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders' property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses. The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and, accountants"-- |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on print version record |
| Umfang: | 1 online resource (xxiv, 189 pages.) |
| ISBN: | 9781003019770 1003019773 |
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| 500 | |a Description based on print version record | ||
| 520 | |a "Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders' property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses. The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and, accountants"-- | ||
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| author_variant | w d h wd wdh |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV047010188 |
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| dewey-full | 346.73/066 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 346 - Private law |
| dewey-raw | 346.73/066 |
| dewey-search | 346.73/066 |
| dewey-sort | 3346.73 266 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV047010188 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T19:07:12Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781003019770 1003019773 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032417725 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| physical | 1 online resource (xxiv, 189 pages.) |
| psigel | ZDB-7-TFC |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | The economics of legal relationships Economics of legal relationships |
| spelling | Huber, Wm. Dennis 1951- Verfasser aut Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors Wm. Dennis Huber Abingdon, Oxon Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2020 © 2020 1 online resource (xxiv, 189 pages.) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier The economics of legal relationships Economics of legal relationships Description based on print version record "Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders' property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that proves shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses. The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and, accountants"-- Corporation law / United States https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003019770 Verlag URL des Erstveroeffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Huber, Wm. Dennis 1951- Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors Corporation law / United States |
| title | Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors |
| title_auth | Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors |
| title_exact_search | Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors |
| title_full | Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors Wm. Dennis Huber |
| title_fullStr | Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors Wm. Dennis Huber |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors Wm. Dennis Huber |
| title_short | Corporate law and the theory of the firm |
| title_sort | corporate law and the theory of the firm reconstructing corporations shareholders directors owners and investors |
| title_sub | reconstructing corporations, shareholders, directors, owners, and investors |
| topic | Corporation law / United States |
| topic_facet | Corporation law / United States |
| url | https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003019770 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT huberwmdennis corporatelawandthetheoryofthefirmreconstructingcorporationsshareholdersdirectorsownersandinvestors |