Unelected power: the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author
How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public l...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton ; Oxford
Princeton University Press
© 2019
[2019] |
| Ausgabe: | First paperback edition |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985 https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985?locatt=mode:legacy https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985 |
| Zusammenfassung: | How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 642 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780691196985 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9780691196985 |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| indexdate | 2025-02-18T17:12:16Z |
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| isbn | 9780691196985 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Tucker, Paul 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)1014279402 aut Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author Paul Tucker First paperback edition © 2019 Princeton ; Oxford Princeton University Press [2019] 1 Online-Ressource (xvi, 642 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business bisacsh Banking law Banks and banking State supervision Financial institutions Government policy Monetary policy Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd rswk-swf Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftslenkung (DE-588)4066470-3 gnd rswk-swf Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 gnd rswk-swf Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd rswk-swf Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd rswk-swf Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 s Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 s Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 s Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 s Wirtschaftslenkung (DE-588)4066470-3 s Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-0-691-19630-5 https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Tucker, Paul 1958- Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business bisacsh Banking law Banks and banking State supervision Financial institutions Government policy Monetary policy Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd Wirtschaftslenkung (DE-588)4066470-3 gnd Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4011413-2 (DE-588)4114382-6 (DE-588)4066470-3 (DE-588)4751640-9 (DE-588)4019902-2 (DE-588)4042669-5 |
| title | Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author |
| title_auth | Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author |
| title_exact_search | Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author |
| title_full | Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author Paul Tucker |
| title_fullStr | Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author Paul Tucker |
| title_full_unstemmed | Unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author Paul Tucker |
| title_short | Unelected power |
| title_sort | unelected power the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state with a new preface by the author |
| title_sub | the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state : with a new preface by the author |
| topic | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business bisacsh Banking law Banks and banking State supervision Financial institutions Government policy Monetary policy Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Legitimation (DE-588)4114382-6 gnd Wirtschaftslenkung (DE-588)4066470-3 gnd Zentralbankautonomie (DE-588)4751640-9 gnd Geldpolitik (DE-588)4019902-2 gnd Notenbank (DE-588)4042669-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business Banking law Banks and banking State supervision Financial institutions Government policy Monetary policy Demokratie Legitimation Wirtschaftslenkung Zentralbankautonomie Geldpolitik Notenbank |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691196985 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tuckerpaul unelectedpowerthequestforlegitimacyincentralbankingandtheregulatorystatewithanewprefacebytheauthor |