Legal methods: how to work with legal arguments
Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Weitere beteiligte Personen: | |
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
München
C.H. Beck
2020
Oxford Hart Baden-Baden Nomos |
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031561927&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Umfang: | XLIV, 584 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 24 cm x 16 cm |
| ISBN: | 9783406743979 9781509938018 9783848764044 3406743978 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV046182406 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20200911 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 191002s2020 gw a||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 015 | |a 19,N23 |2 dnb | ||
| 016 | 7 | |a 1187363146 |2 DE-101 | |
| 020 | |a 9783406743979 |c Beck. Leinen : EUR 150.00 (DE) |9 978-3-406-74397-9 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781509938018 |c Hart |9 978-1-5099-3801-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 9783848764044 |c Nomos |9 978-3-8487-6404-4 | ||
| 020 | |a 3406743978 |9 3-406-74397-8 | ||
| 024 | 3 | |a 9783406743979 | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1136376427 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)DNB1187363146 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a gw |c XA-DE-BY | ||
| 049 | |a DE-703 |a DE-706 |a DE-M382 |a DE-384 |a DE-12 |a DE-19 |a DE-739 |a DE-29 |a DE-11 |a DE-91 |a DE-523 | ||
| 084 | |a PI 3000 |0 (DE-625)136582: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a PC 5720 |0 (DE-625)135101: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a PI 3010 |0 (DE-625)136584: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a JUR 024 |2 stub | ||
| 084 | |a 340 |2 sdnb | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Möllers, Thomas M. J. |d 1962- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)121514579 |4 aut | |
| 240 | 1 | 0 | |a Juristische Methodenlehre |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Legal methods |b how to work with legal arguments |c by Thomas M.J. Möllers ; translated by Gill Mertens |
| 264 | 1 | |a München |b C.H. Beck |c 2020 | |
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford |b Hart | |
| 264 | 1 | |a Baden-Baden |b Nomos | |
| 300 | |a XLIV, 584 Seiten |b Illustrationen, Diagramme |c 24 cm x 16 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Juristische Methodik |0 (DE-588)4114116-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Deutschland |0 (DE-588)4011882-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 653 | |a Rechtstheorie | ||
| 653 | |a Methodenlehre | ||
| 653 | |a Europarecht | ||
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4123623-3 |a Lehrbuch |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Deutschland |0 (DE-588)4011882-4 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Juristische Methodik |0 (DE-588)4114116-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mertens, Gill |0 (DE-588)114354174X |4 trl | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Verlag C.H. Beck |0 (DE-588)1023902869 |4 pbl | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m SWB Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031561927&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031561927 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-TUM_call_number | 0002 JUR 024 2020 A 3097 |
|---|---|
| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 2497108 |
| DE-BY-TUM_location | 00 |
| DE-BY-TUM_media_number | 040008741464 |
| _version_ | 1821934280660484096 |
| adam_text | TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE VII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IX
TRANSLATOR S NOTE XI
ILLUSTRATIONS XXIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XXXI
DATABASES FOR GERMAN, EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN LEGISLATIVE ACTS XLI
PRINCIPAL WORKS CITED XLIII
PARTI
THE BASICS - SOURCES OF LAW
CHAPTER 1. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A THEORY OF LEGITIMACY AND JUSTIFICATION
1
I. THE PURPOSE OF LEGAL METHODOLOGY 2
1. DETERMINING THE MEANING OF A LEGAL TEXT 2
2. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A POSTMODERN METHODOLOGY - CONTENT OF THIS BOOK
3
A) POSTMODERN METHODOLOGY AS CRITICISM OF TRADITIONAL METHODOLOGY 3
B) A MODERN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 3
C) METHODOLOGY AS A THEORY OF LEGITIMACY AND ARGUMENTATION 4
D) THE NECESSITY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION CONCEPTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 6
3. THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN LAW ON DISCOVERING THE LAW 7
A) EUROPEAN ARTICLES AND THE MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 7
B) THE NATIONAL JUDGE AS EUROPEAN JUDGE 7
4. THE WORLDWIDE RELEVANCE OF FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION IN THE
JUSTIFICATION OF LEGAL
DECISIONS 8
A) THE GLOBAL CLAIM OF LEGAL FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 8
B) LEGAL METHODOLOGY AND CASE LAW 9
II. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A THEORY OF LEGITIMACY 10
1. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A JUDICIAL DECISION 10
A) PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 11
B) LEGALISM 11
C) THEORY OF MATERIALITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY (NULLURN CRIMEN
SINE LEGE) 11
D) THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO STATE
REASONS 13
E) INFRINGEMENT OF THE EQUALITY OF APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 3(1) OF THE
BASIC LAW 14
F) THE DUTY TO STATE REASONS AT EUROPEAN LEVEL 14
2. METHODOLOGY AS THEORY OF LEGITIMACY TO LIMIT THE JUDGE S POWER 15
A) LIMITATION OF POWER VIS-A-VIS PARLIAMENT 15
B) LIMITATION OF POWER VIS-A-VIS CITIZENS 16
C) RIGHT OF THE JUDGE TO DEVELOP THE LAW (ARTICLE 20(3) OF THE BASIC
LAW) 16
3. THE STYLE OF REASONING AND CITATION PRACTICE OF COURTS IN EUROPE 19
A) THE JUDGMENT AND CITATION STYLE OF NATIONAL COURTS 19
B) THE REASONING STYLE OF THE ECJ 21
III. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION 21
1. THE CLAIM TO TRUTH AND CONTENTIOUS LAWYERS 21
A) THE APPARENTLY CORRECT DECISION: ONE-RIGHT-ANSWER THESIS 21
B) DECISIONS BASED ON A FIXED PRECONCEPTION 23
C) RATIONALISING A JUSTIFIABLE DECISION 25
2. THE PURPOSE OF THE THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION 26
A) REFUTABILITY OF INCORRECT APPROACHES 26
B) RATIONALISING JUSTIFIABLE RESULTS 27
C) OPENNESS, CREATIVITY AND SYNTHESIS AS THE BASIS FOR CONVINCING
SOLUTIONS 27
3. LEGAL FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 29
A) THESIS, PREMISE AND ARGUMENT 29
B) LEGAL ARGUMENTATION CONCEPTS AS A PREMISE FOR A THESIS 29
XIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. WEIGHTING OF ARGUMENTATION CONCEPTS 30
A) BINDING PRIORITY RULE 30
B) PRESUMPTION RULE 31
C) BALANCING RULE 31
D) RULE ABOUT THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF THE ARGUMENT 31
E) CONCEPT OF LEGAL FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 32
IV. THE CLAIM TO JUSTICE OF LEGAL METHODOLOGY 33
1. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AND THE CLAIM TO JUSTICE 33
A) THE SUPPOSED INJUSTICE IN METHODOLOGY (RUTHERS) 33
B) THEORIES OF DISCOURSE 33
2. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A VALUE-BASED THEORY OF LEGITIMACY AND
ARGUMENTATION 34
A) HUMAN DIGNITY AND NATURAL LAW AS THE ULTIMATE VALIDATION 34
B) LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A RATIONAL THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION TO PREVENT
UNFAIR OUTCOMES 35
C) LEGAL METHOD AND THE CLAIM THAT JURISPRUDENCE IS A SCIENCE 36
3. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE AS LEGAL CONCEPTS 36
A) JUSTICE AND ARISTOTLE 36
B) JUSTICE, APPROPRIATENESS AND LEGAL CERTAINTY AS LEGAL CONCEPTS
(RADBRUCH) 37
C) HUMAN DIGNITY AND PROTECTION OF LEGAL RIGHTS 37
D) SECURING FREEDOMS 38
V. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1 38
CHAPTER 2. SOURCES OF LAW 40
I. LAW AND SOURCES OF LAW 41
1. CRITERIA FOR DESCRIBING LAW 41
A) SOURCES OF LAW AND SOURCES OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 41
B) VALIDITY AND BINDING EFFECT 42
C) LEGAL PROVISIONS AS NORMS PRESCRIBING CONDUCT 43
D) SANCTIONS AND ENFORCING LAWS 44
2. DIFFERENTIATING LAW FROM MORALITY, ETHICS AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
45
A) MORALITY, ETHICS AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS 45
B) DELINEATION FROM LAW 46
C) THE MUTUAL INFLUENCE OF MORALITY AND LAW 47
II. HIERARCHY OF LEGAL SOURCES IN GERMANY 48
1. STATUTES AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN GERMANY 48
A) DIFFERENCES AND OVERLAPS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 48
B) DIFFERENTIATING LEGAL NORMS: STATUTES, STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS AND
BY-LAWS 49
2. HIGHER-RANKING LAW: THE HIERARCHY OF THE LAW AND THE LEX SUPERIOR
RULE AS A CONFLICT-
OF-LAW RULE 50
3. THE HIERARCHY OF GERMAN LAW 52
A) FEDERAL LAW AND STATE LAW 52
B) CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW (ARTICLES 31, 72 OF THE BASIC
LAW) 52
4. AMENDMENTS, LEGAL CERTAINTY, AND PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
53
A) TERMINOLOGY 53
B) GENUINE RETROACTIVE EFFECT/RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
54
C) NON-GENUINE RETROACTIVE EFFECT/RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF CONSTITUENT
FACTS 54
III. THE HIERARCHY OF LAW IN GERMANY TODAY, INCLUDING EUROPEAN LAW 55
1. EUROPEAN LAW AS SUPRANATIONAL LAW 55
A) EUROPEAN LAW AS AN AUTONOMOUS LEGAL SYSTEM 55
B) EUROPEAN LEGAL SOURCES - DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN PRIMARY, SECONDARY
AND TERTIARY LAW 56
C) NORM HIERARCHIES AND INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN LAW IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PRIMARY
LAW 58
2. THE AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN LAW 60
A) AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION BY THE ECJ 60
B) EXCEPTIONS TO AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION 61
C) DUTY FOR NATIONAL JUDGES TO APPLY AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION 61
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFERRAL 62
A) STARTING POINT 62
B) TYPES OF COMPETENCE 62
C) RULES ON EXERCISING COMPETENCE 62
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. HIGHER-RANKING LAW: THE SUPREMACY OF UNION LAW OVER NATIONAL LAW 63
A) THE UNITARY APPROACH OF THE ECJ: DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF EUROPEAN LAW
63
B) PRIMACY OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 64
C) THE DUALIST PERSPECTIVE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: DIRECT
APPLICABILITY ON
THE BASIS OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 66
IV. THE HIERARCHY OF LAW IN GERMANY TODAY, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL LAW
67
1. SOURCES OF LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 67
2. THE AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 68
3. THE HIERARCHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 69
4. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LAW 69
A) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BASIC LAW 69
B) RELATIONSHIP OF THE ECHR TO THE BASIC LAW 70
V. NATURAL LAW 71
1. THE RELEVANCE OF NATURAL LAW 71
A) OPPONENTS OF NATURAL LAW 71
B) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL LAW 72
C) MEDIATING PERSPECTIVE: NARROW SCOPE OF NATURAL LAW, AND WIDER SCOPE
OF
SUPRANATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES 72
2. PRIMACY OF NATURAL LAW OVER THE UNAMBIGUOUS LAW OF INJUSTICE
(RADBRUCH FORMULA).... 73
3. POSITIVE FORMS OF NATURAL LAW 74
A) NATURAL LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY 74
B) LEGAL CONCEPTS AND NO DIRECT SUBSUMPTION 75
VI. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 75
CHAPTER 3. SECONDARY SOURCES OF LAW AND SOURCES OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 76
I. PROBLEMS: SOURCES OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE ALONGSIDE PRIMARY SOURCES OF
LAW? 77
1. THE PREVIOUS DUALISTIC APPROACH: RESTRICTED DEFINITION OF SOURCES OF
LAW, AND SOURCES OF
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 77
2. THE BROAD DEFINITION OF LEGAL SOURCES - LINKED LEGAL STRUCTURES AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE
HIERARCHY OF LAW 79
3. MEDIATING PERSPECTIVE: THE THEORY OF SECONDARY SOURCES OF LAW 81
A) DUTY OF REFERRAL, SUBSIDIARY DUTY OF COMPLIANCE AND PRESUMPTION OF
CONFORMITY 81
B) EXTENT OF THE PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY 83
4. BEYOND LEGAL POSITIVISM AND NATURAL LAW 83
A) LEGAL POSITIVISM (KELSEN) AND DUALISM OF METHODS 83
B) EXTENDING THE THEORY OF SOURCES OF LAW TO METHODOLOGICAL POLARITY 83
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CASE LAW IN THE DETERMINATION OF LAW 84
1. THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 84
2. THE DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY SOURCES OF LAW 85
A) DUTIES OF REFERRAL AND COMPLIANCE, AND REJECTION OF CUSTOMARY LAW 85
B) CHANGE IN PRECEDENT: LEGAL CERTAINTY AND PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION
VERSUS MATERIAL JUSTICE 86
C) CHANGING ECJ CASE LAW, LEGAL CERTAINTY AND PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION 89
3. STRICTLY BINDING PRECEDENT AS AN EXCEPTION IN GERMAN LEGAL CIRCLES 89
A) THE STARE DECISIS RULE AND PERSUASIVE AUTHORITIES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL CIRCLES.... 89
B) BINDING NATURE OF THE RULINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 90
C) JUDGMENTS BINDING OTHER COURTS 91
D) BINDING NATURE OF DECISIONS OF THE ECJ 91
III. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS, PRIVATE RULE-SETTING, AND EUROPEAN
RECOMMENDATIONS 92
1. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 92
A) ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS TO INTERPRET AND SUBSTANTIATE NORMS 92
B) ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AS SECONDARY SOURCES OF LAW 93
C) PROTECTING THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF CITIZENS 93
2. PRIVATE RULE-SETTING AND THE DEMARCATION TO STANDARD TERMS AND
CONDITIONS, CONTRACTS
AND SOFT LAW 94
A) LEGALISATION OF PRIVATE NORMS 94
B) LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY 94
C) DECLARATION OF CONFORMITY (COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN) 95
D) SUBSTANTIATION OF GENERAL CLAUSES BY PRIVATE RULE-SETTING 96
XV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 97
A) PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY AND PREREQUISITES 97
B) LEGAL CERTAINTY AND PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION 98
4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS UNDER EU LAW 98
A) PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROVISIONS UNDER
EULAW 98
B) STATUTORY EXAMPLES OF DUTIES OF REFERRAL AND COMPLIANCE 99
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE DETERMINATION OF LAW 99
1. THE OBLIGATION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF COMPARATIVE LAW DURING
INTERPRETATION UNDER
EUROPEAN LAW, UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 100
A) INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 100
B) UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL LAW (SEE ARTICLE 7 UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS) 100
C) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE ECHR 101
D) THE NATIONAL LEGAL PRACTITIONER AS A EUROPEAN LEGAL PRACTITIONER 101
2. CASE GROUPS USING NON-BINDING COMPARATIVE LAW 102
3. THE LEGAL QUALITY OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: BETWEEN PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
AND MERE SOURCE
OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 104
4. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARATIVE LAW FOR THE ECJ AND THE ECTHR 105
A) OBLIGATION FOR THE ECJ TO USE COMPARATIVE LAW 105
B) NON-BINDING USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW AT THE ECJ 106
C) COMPARATIVE LAW AT THE ECTHR 106
V. ACADEMIC LEGAL LITERATURE 106
VI. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 107
PART 2
INTERPRETATION
CHAPTER 4. WORDING, SYSTEMATICS AND HISTORY AS TRADITIONAL METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION 109
I. INTERPRETATION AND SUBSUMPTION 110
1. DEDUCTIVE SYLLOGISM AND SUBSUMPTION 110
A) SUBSUMPTION AS A LOGICAL CONCLUSION 110
B) BUILDING-BLOCK TECHNIQUE 112
C) INTERACTIONS OF NORMS AND FACTS - THE HIN- UND HERWANDERN DES BLICKES
AND CASE-
NORM THEORY 112
D) DEVELOPING DEFINITIONS TO SUBSTANTIATE INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUENT FACTS
115
2. THE FOUR TRADITIONAL CANONS OF INTERPRETATION 115
A) THE FOUR CANONS OF INTERPRETATION OF VON SAVIGNY 115
B) THE CURRENT IMPACT OF THE FOUR CANONS OF INTERPRETATION, AND THEIR
MEANING IN
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES 117
C) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERPRETATION CANONS FOR THE ECJ 118
3. CRITICISM OF THE FOUR INTERPRETATION METHODS AND THE SUBSUMPTION
MODEL 119
4. INTERPRETATION, SUBSTANTIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 120
A) INTERPRETATION, SUBSTANTIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AS CREATION
OF LAW 120
B) THE LIMITS OF THE WORD AS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND
DEVELOPING THE
LAW 121
C) THE FLUID BOUNDARY BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
121
D) CONSEQUENCES - THE INCREASED BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION 121
II. GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION 121
1. GRAMMATICAL INTERPRETATION AS THE START OF THE INTERPRETATION PROCESS
121
2. TOOLS TO DETERMINE CLEAR OR AMBIGUOUS WORDING 122
A) LEGAL DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS AND LEGAL FICTIONS AS THE LEGAL
LANGUAGE OF THE
LEGISLATURE 124
B) NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE TERMS 126
C) NARROW (RESTRICTIVE) AND BROAD (EXTENSIVE) INTERPRETATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL
CONSTITUENT FACTS OF THE CASE 126
D) GENERAL LANGUAGE USE 127
3. THE CLARITY RULE OF THE WORDING (ACTE CLAIR DOCTRINE, LITERAL RULE,
TEXTUALISM) AS AN
INTERPRETATION CONCEPT 128
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. LIMITS OF THE WORDING AND THE PROHIBITION OF ANALOGY 129
A) THE FOUR FORMS OF THE RULE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLE 129
B) THE PROHIBITION OF ANALOGY (NULLUTN CRIMEN, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
STRICTA) 129
C) THE PROHIBITION OF NON-SPECIFIC CRIMES (NULLUM CRIMEN, NULLA POENA
SINE LEGE CERTA) 132
D) PROHIBITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW (NULLA POENA SINE LEGE SCRIPTA) 134
E) PROHIBITION OF RETROACTIVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
PRAEVIA) 134
5. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORDING FOR THE ECJ 135
A) THE WORDING IN MULTI-LANGUAGE LEGAL TEXTS 135
B) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEGAL USAGE AND GENERAL USE OF LANGUAGE AT THE
ECJ 136
C) THE ECJ AND THE LIMITS OF WORDING IN CRIMINAL AND TAX LAW 136
III. SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION 137
1. MEANING 137
A) THE IDEAL OF A CONSISTENT LEGAL SYSTEM 137
B) SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION IN THE HIERARCHY OF LAW 139
C) THE OVERALL SYSTEM OF THE CIVIL CODE - JURISPRUDENCE OF CONCEPTS:
CONCEPTUAL
PYRAMIDS - BUILDING BLOCK TECHNIQUES - REFERENCES 140
D) THE INTERNAL SYSTEM OF THE LAW AND THE VALUES OF THE CIVIL CODE 142
2. INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION CONCEPTS 144
A) COMPARISON OF THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF A NORM 144
B) POSITION OF THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENT WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW
145
C) DEROGATIONS MUST NOT BE INTERPRETED AS EXTENDING THE LAW (SINGULARIA
NON SUNT
EXTENDENDA) 146
D) UNIFORMITY OF LEGAL ORDER AND THE CONSTITUTION 146
3. CONFLICT-OF-LAW RULES 148
A) A HIGHER-RANKING LAW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER A LOWER-RANKING LAW (LEX
SUPERIOR
DEROGAT LEGI INFERIORI) 148
B) A MORE RECENT LAW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER AN EARLIER LAW (LEX POSTERIOR
DEROGAT LEGI
PRIORI) 148
C) A SPECIFIC LAW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER A MORE GENERALISED LAW (LEX
SPECIALIS DEROGAT
LEGI GENERALI) 148
4. SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATION BY THE ECJ 149
A) THE ROLE OF SYSTEMATICS 149
B) CONFLICT-OF-LAW RULES 150
C) DEROGATIONS INTERPRETED NARROWLY 150
D) OTHER ARGUMENTATION CONCEPTS 151
IV. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 151
1. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE BROAD AND NARROW SENSE 151
A) RELEVANCE AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE BROAD SENSE 151
B) TERMINOLOGY 152
C) PRECURSOR NORMS AS AIDS FOR NARROW HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 152
D) CONTINUITY BETWEEN THE PRECURSOR NORM AND THE CURRENT NORM (DROIT
CONSTANT) 153
E) CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 154
2. LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN THE MATERIALS OF THE CONCRETE NORM 154
A) GENETIC INTERPRETATION 154
B) PREAMBLE AND OBJECTIVES AS LEGALLY IMMANENT MATERIALS 155
C) USING OFFICIAL MATERIALS FROM THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AS AN AID 155
D) INTENT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL
INTENT 157
E) CONTINUITY ARGUMENT: CLEAR INTENT REMAINS VALID 157
F) CUMULATION OF GENETIC SOURCES 158
3. THE MEANING OF THE HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION FOR THE ECJ 158
A) THE MEANING OF BROAD HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION FOR THE ECJ 158
B) CONTINUITY WITH THE PRECURSOR NORM AS NARROW HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 158
C) CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION AS NARROW HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 159
D) GENETIC INTERPRETATION - PREAMBLE AND RECITALS AS LEGALLY IMMANENT
SOURCES 159
E) OFFICIAL MATERIALS AS AIDS TO GENETIC INTERPRETATION 160
V. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 161
XVII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 5. TELOS, LOGIC AND IMPACT-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION 162
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AS TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 163
1. ON TELOS, THE RATIO LEGIS 163
A) TERMINOLOGY 163
B) THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LAW OF THE EU
164
C) THE SUPPOSED SUPERFLUOUSNESS OF THE TELOS 165
D) THE TELOS AS PREMISE 165
2. DETERMINING THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW 166
A) INTERNAL PURPOSE OF THE LAW 166
B) EXPRESS OR IMPLIED PURPOSE OF THE NORM 167
C) AIDS TO INTERPRETATION: IN DUBIO PRO LIBERTATE, PRO CONSUMENTE, FAVOR
LABORIS 167
3. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF VALUES 168
A) FROM JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS TO JURISPRUDENCE OF VALUES 168
B) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERESTS-BASED INTERPRETATION AND TELEOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION.... 170
II. INDIVIDUAL LOGICAL FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 171
1. CONTRAVENTION OF THE GENERAL RULES OF LOGIC 171
2. CIRCULAR ARGUMENT (PETITIO PRINCIPII) 172
A) CIRCULAR ARGUMENT (PETITIO PRINCIPII) 172
B) THE ARGUMENTUM EX SILENTIO 174
3. LEAP IN CONCLUSION (SALTUS IN CONCLUDENDO) 175
4. AVOIDING CIRCUMVENTION OF THE LAW 175
5. AVOIDANCE OF RULE CONTRADICTIONS, APPROXIMATION OF NORMS AND
MAINTAINING THE SCOPE
OF A NORM 176
6. INDIVIDUAL FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION OF THE ECJ 178
III. IMPACT-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION 178
1. TERMINOLOGY, AND RELEVANCE FOR IMPACT-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION 178
2. THE LIMITS OF IMPACT-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION 179
3. INDIVIDUAL FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 180
A) AVOIDING ABSURD OR IMPRACTICAL RESULTS (ARGUMENTUM AD ABSURDUM) 180
B) ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION: AVOIDANCE OF EXCESSIVE LIABILITY OR UNDUE
HARDSHIP 182
C) THE LAW DOES NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH INSIGNIFICANT MATTERS (DE
MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX) 185
D) AVOIDING HARMFUL EFFECTS AND ENABLING PRACTICABLE OUTCOMES 186
E) THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, GENERAL LIFE EXPERIENCE, NORMATIVE POWER OF THE
FACTUAL 188
F) NORMATIVE POWER OF THE FACTUAL 189
G) ACCEPTANCE OF THE DECISION AND PREVAILING OPINION 190
H) DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT.... 191
I) ATTEMPT AT A MEDIATING LEGAL VIEW 191
4. IMPACT-ORIENTED ARGUMENTATION AT THE ECJ 192
A) AVOIDING ABSURD OR IMPRACTICAL RESULTS (ARGUMENTUM AD ABSURDUM) 192
B)EFFETUTILE 192
C) DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LEGAL REMEDIES 194
D) THE LAW DOES NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH INSIGNIFICANT MATTERS FROM THE
EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 195
E) PRACTICAL RESULTS 195
IV. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 196
1. AIMS AND METHODS OF THE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 196
A) HOMO OECONOMICUS AND ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY 196
B) COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER 197
2. THE LIMITS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 198
A) BOUNDED RATIONALITY OF HUMAN BEINGS 198
B) CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AND THE VALUES OF THE LEGISLATURE 199
C) INSUFFICIENT EMPIRICAL DATA 200
3. THE IMPORTANCE FOR LEGAL METHODOLOGY 200
A) IMPORTANCE FOR LEGAL APPLICATION 200
B) COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER, AND LIABILITY 201
C) LIABILITY AND PREVENTION 203
D) INFORMATION GAPS AND THE CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER 204
E) THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 205
0 GAME THEORY 206
XVIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ECJ 206
A) ECONOMIC QUESTIONS UNDER EU ANTITRUST LAW 206
B) THE INTERNAL MARKET AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROTECTION 207
V. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5 207
CHAPTER 6. IDEOLOGICAL COUNTER CONCEPTS AND SIMPLE FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW 208
I. TELEOLOGICAL COUNTER CONCEPTS TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS 209
1. WORDING 209
A) REJECTION OF THE CLARITY RULE 209
B) LEGAL USE OF LANGUAGE 211
C) IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORDING 211
D) DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 212
2. SYSTEM 212
A) CORRECTION OF THE SYSTEMATIC DEFINITION OF THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS
212
B) RELATIVITY OF LEGAL TERMS AND DIFFERENTIATING INTERPRETATION 213
C) BROAD INTERPRETATION OF EXCEPTIONS 217
D) CONFLICT-OF-LAW RULES: THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATIVITY SUPPRESSES THE
LEX SPECIALIS
PRINCIPLE 218
E) RELATIVISATION OF THE LEX POSTERIOR PRINCIPLE 219
F) PRINCIPLES IN DUBIO PRO LIBERTATE, FAVOR LABORIS, PRO CONSUMENTE ETC.
DO NOT APPLY.... 219
3. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 220
A) DISCONTINUITY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF GENETIC INTERPRETATION: SUBJECTIVE
INTENT OF THE
PREVIOUS NORM NO LONGER APPLIES 220
B) SUBJECTIVE INTENT IS UNCLEAR, AMBIGUOUS OR CONTRADICTORY (PERPLEXITY)
220
C) DECISIVENESS OF NORMATIVE, SUBJECTIVE INTENT 221
D) EDITORIAL ERROR 221
E) OBJECTIVE THEORY 223
4. TELOS, IMPACT-ORIENTED AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 223
A) ILLOGICAL LAW 223
B) THE BOUNDARIES OF IMPACT-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 224
II. SUBJECTIVE VERSUS OBJECTIVE THEORY 225
1. THE DISPUTE AS A LONG-RUNNING ISSUE IN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 225
2. SUBJECTIVE THEORY 227
A) IMPORTANCE OF THE INTENT OF THE PROMULGATING LEGISLATURE 227
B) DELIBERATE OMISSION - THE ELOQUENT SILENCE OF THE LEGISLATURE 227
C) CRITICISM OF SUBJECTIVE THEORY 228
3. OBJECTIVE THEORY 229
A) INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW IN ITS TEMPORAL CONTEXT 229
B) THE LAW IS WISER THAN THE LEGISLATURE AND AGEING CODIFICATION - THE
ORIGINAL PURPOSE
OF THE RULE IS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE 229
C) THE NATURE OF THE MATTER 230
D) CRITICISM OF OBJECTIVE THEORY 230
4. THE SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE THEORY AS A UNIFIED THEORY 232
5. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION 233
A) FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ECJ 233
B) THE US PERSPECTIVE: TEXTUALISM, PURPOSIVISM VERSUS LIVING ORIGINALISM
233
III. ORDINARY FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 234
1. TELEOLOGICAL REDUCTION 234
A) METHODICAL BASIS 234
B) FOUR EXAMINATION STEPS TO JUSTIFY TELEOLOGICAL REDUCTION 235
C) UNFAIRNESS AND ARGUMENTUM AD ABSURDUM AS FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 237
2. THE DISPUTE ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF AN OMISSION 238
A) THE OMISSION AS FATA MORGANA? 238
B) THE UNINTENTIONAL OMISSION {PLANWIDRIGE LIICKE) AS PREMISE 238
C) THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF OMISSIONS 239
3. INDIVIDUAL ANALOGY (STATUTORY ANALOGY) 240
A) METHODICAL BASIS - THE SIMILARITY ARGUMENT (ARGUMENTUM A SIMILE) 240
B) FOUR EXAMINATION STEPS TO JUSTIFY INDIVIDUAL ANALOGY 241
C) A FORTIORI CONCLUSION AND UNFAIRNESS AS FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 243
XIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
D) TWO VARIANTS OF THE SIMILARITY COMPARISON 245
E) THE UNINTENTIONAL OMISSION AND THE CIRCUMVENTION ARGUMENT 246
4. GENERAL ANALOGY (LEGAL ANALOGY) 247
A) METHODOLOGICAL BASIS 247
B) FOUR EXAMINATION STEPS TO JUSTIFY A GENERAL ANALOGY 248
C) COHERENCE WITH THE INTERNAL SYSTEM OF THE LAW AS A FIGURE OF
ARGUMENTATION FOR THE
JUSTIFICATION OF THE UNINTENTIONAL OMISSION 250
5. ORDINARY FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 252
A) THE TERM INTERPRETATION 252
B) TELEOLOGICAL REDUCTION 253
C) INDIVIDUAL ANALOGY 253
D) GENERAL ANALOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LEGAL CONCEPTS 254
IV. THE DIFFICULT SEARCH FOR TELOS 254
1. MISSING LINK TO A CONSTITUENT ELEMENT 254
2. MULTIPLE REGULATORY PURPOSES 256
V. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6 257
PART 3
SUBSTANTIATION
CHAPTER 7. SUBSTANTIATION OF LAW BY THE LEGISLATURE, THE ADMINISTRATION
AND THE COURTS 259
I. SUBSTANTIATION OF THE LAW 259
1. INTERPRETATION VERSUS SUBSTANTIATION 259
A) INTERPRETATION AS THE FIRST STEP 259
B) SUBSTANTIATION AS A NECESSARY SECOND STEP 260
2. GENERAL CLAUSES - CURSE OR BLESSING? 261
A) GENERAL CLAUSES AND INDEFINITE LEGAL TERMS 261
B) DELEGATION, LEGAL DEVELOPMENT, FLEXIBILITY AND RECEPTION FUNCTIONS OF
GENERAL CLAUSES 262
C) GENERAL CLAUSES IN EUROPEAN LAW 264
II. SUBSTANTIATION BY THE LEGISLATURE 264
1. GENERAL CLAUSES AND RULE EXAMPLES IN GERMAN LAW 264
A) SYSTEMATICS AND TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 264
B) LEGAL DEFINITIONS AND RULE EXAMPLES IN PRIVATE LAW 265
2. GENERAL CLAUSES AND RULE EXAMPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW 266
A) INDEFINITE LEGAL CONCEPTS IN THE CONSTITUENT FACTS 266
B) RULE EXAMPLES AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 267
3. SUBSTANTIATION OF GENERAL CLAUSES BY THE EUROPEAN LEGISLATURE 268
A) LEGAL DEFINITIONS AND RULE EXAMPLES 268
B) ANNEXES 269
C) EXHAUSTIVE OR OPEN CHARACTER OF STATUTORY SUBSTANTIATION 269
III. SUBSTANTIATION BY THE ADMINISTRATION OR PRIVATE REGULATORY SYSTEMS
270
1. GERMAN LAW 270
A) STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 270
B) ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 270
C) PRIVATE REGULATORY SYSTEMS 271
2. EUROPEAN LAW 271
IV. THE COMPARATIVE CASE METHOD AS SUBSTANTIATION BY THE COURTS 272
1. THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL ANALOGY AND THE COMPARATIVE CASE
METHOD 273
A) THE COMPARATIVE CASE METHOD IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 273
B) REASONING FROM CASE TO CASE (REASONING FROM THE SPECIFIC TO THE
SPECIFIC) 273
C) ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMPARATIVE CASE METHOD 274
D) THE FORMATION OF A GENERALISABLE LEGAL SENTENCE BY COMBINING
INDUCTION AND
DEDUCTION 275
2. THE BINDING NATURE OF COURT DECISIONS 277
A) ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: FUNDAMENTAL REASONS (RATIO DECIDENDI), OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
(OBITER DICTUM), DISTINGUISHING AND OVERRULING 277
B) GERMAN LAW: FUNDAMENTAL REASONS (RATIO DECIDENDI), OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS (OBITER
DICTUM), DISTINGUISHING AND OVERRULING 280
3. THE COMPARATIVE CASE METHOD OF THE EC] 282
XX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. INDIVIDUAL ARGUMENTS IN CASE LAW 282
A) FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS AND CONSOLIDATED JURISPRUDENCE AS ARGUMENTATION
CONCEPTS 282
B) ARGUMENTS IN THE HIERARCHY OF CASE LAW 283
5. THE LEGAL COMPARATIVE METHOD: THE HOW 283
A) COMPULSORY COMPARATIVE LAW USING THE EXAMPLE OF UNIFORM LAW AND
EUROPEAN LAW 283
B) VOLUNTARY COMPARATIVE LAW 284
C) COMPARATIVE LAW AT THE ECJ AND ECTHR 286
V. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 7 288
CHAPTER 8. THE BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM, CASE GROUPS AND COMPARATIVE CASE GROUP
AS SUBSTANTIA-
TION METHODS 289
I. THE BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM (FLEXIBLE SYSTEM) 290
1. THE BASICS 290
A) DISCOVERER OF THE BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM 290
B) CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF THE BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM 291
C) CONCLUSIVE EVALUATION 291
2. APPLICATION IN GERMAN LAW 292
A) ATTRIBUTION CRITERIA TO SUBSTANTIATE OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
SECTION 823(1)
OF THE CIVIL CODE 292
B) ATTRIBUTION CRITERIA FOR CONTRAVENTION OF PUBLIC MORALS PURSUANT TO
SECTIONS 138
AND 826 OF THE CIVIL CODE 294
C) PRE-CONTRACTUAL AND CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION 295
3. APPLICATION IN EUROPEAN LAW 297
II. CASE GROUPS TO SUBSTANTIATE GENERAL CLAUSES 297
1. CASE GROUPS 297
A) THE OBJECTIVE OF A CASE GROUP 297
B) REQUIREMENT OF SIMILAR CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF A CASE GROUP 298
C) OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS 299
2. CASE GROUPS IN EUROPEAN LAW 299
III. THE STRUCTURING OF SEVERAL ATTRIBUTION CRITERIA OF DIFFERENT CASE
GROUPS 300
1. ATTRIBUTION CRITERIA OF DIFFERENT CASE GROUPS AS A BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM
300
2. DEVELOPING NEW CASE GROUPS - A FLUX 302
3. ESTABLISHING A NEW CASE GROUP UNDER EUROPEAN LAW 305
IV. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 8 305
CHAPTER 9. LEGAL DOCTRINE AND GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES 306
I. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 307
1. THE USE OF LEGAL DOCTRINE FOR LEGAL METHODOLOGY 307
A) ELEMENTS, OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 307
B) RISKS OF A PRACTICAL FORM OF LEGAL DOCTRINE (GEBRAUCHSDOGMATIK) 308
2. LEGAL DOCTRINE AND LEGAL METHODOLOGY 309
A) THE LINKS BETWEEN LEGAL DOCTRINE AND LEGAL METHODOLOGY 309
B) SUBSTANTIATION AND CONSTRUCTION AS FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION TO
INTEGRATE LEGAL
DOCTRINE INTO METHODOLOGY 310
C) THE ADVANTAGES OF COMBINING METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 311
3. DIFFERENTIATING LEGAL IDEAS, LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND LEGAL CONCEPTS 313
A) LEGAL IDEAS AS VALUES 313
B) LEGAL PRINCIPLES 313
C) LEGAL CONCEPTS AS LEGAL PROPOSITIONS 314
II. USING LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN CASES: JUSTIFICATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE 315
1. THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE AS A FIRST STEP: RECOURSE TO
STATUTE OR INDUCTION 315
A) THE HISTORICAL DERIVATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES 315
B) INDIVIDUAL OR GENERAL ANALOGY 315
C) DIFFERENT WAYS OF ESTABLISHING A LEGAL PRINCIPLE 316
2. THE SUBSTANTIATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES AS A NECESSARY SECOND STEP 317
A) THE SUBSTANTIATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO THE LEGAL PROPOSITION OR
LEGAL CONCEPT 318
B) SUBSTANTIATION BY WEIGHING UP INTERESTS 318
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN PRIVATE LAW: DERIVATION AND SUBSTANTIATION OF
PRIVATE AUTONOMY 319
1. INDUCTIVE DERIVATION OF PACTA SUNT SERVANDA 319
XXI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A) FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AS A RESULT OF FREEDOM OF INTENT 319
B) THE REASON FOR THE BINDING CONTRACT (PACTA SUNT SERVANDA) 320
2. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND APPARENTLY CONTRADICTORY LEGAL PRINCIPLES 321
A) THE CONTROVERSIAL DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO
CONTRACT 321
B) ON THE CONTROVERSIAL PRICE CONTROL OF CONTRACTS - THE LAESIO ENORMIS
322
C) DISRUPTION OF THE BASIS OF THE BUSINESS AND CLAUSULA REBUS SIC
STANTIBUS 323
IV. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AS JUSTIFICATION OF VARIOUS LEGAL
CONCEPTS 324
1. APPROACHES IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 324
A) PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND CONTRACTUAL FAIRNESS 324
B) PRIVATE AUTONOMY AS OPTIMISATION 325
C) FURTHER APPROACHES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE AUTONOMY 326
2. PRIVATE AUTONOMY AS SELF-DETERMINATION FOR BOTH PARTIES 326
A) SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND MUTUAL SELF-DETERMINATION
326
B) THE DERIVATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION FROM THE CIVIL
CODE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 327
C) RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION AS A SUBSTANTIATING
MEASURE TO
CORRECT THE CONTRACT 328
3. THE LEGAL-DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE VARIOUS LEGAL CONCEPTS WITH
A LACK OF THE RIGHT
TO SELF-DETERMINATION 328
A) OBLIGATION TO CONTRACT AND LACK OF SELF-DETERMINATION 328
B) PRICE CONTROLS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 138(1) OF THE CIVIL CODE
FOR CONTRACTS
THAT SEVERELY RESTRICT FREEDOM BY INTERFERING WITH THE SELF-DETERMINED
LIFESTYLE 329
C) FREEDOM-RESTRICTING LACK OF EQUIVALENCE AS A DISRUPTION OF THE BASIS
OF THE
TRANSACTION 330
4. THE SUBSTANTIATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LEGAL CONCEPTS THROUGH THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 331
V. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 332
1. CHALLENGES IN DERIVING PRINCIPLES AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 332
A) DIFFICULTIES AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 332
B) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LAW 333
2. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN LAW 333
A) ISOLATED CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN LEGAL PRINCIPLES 333
B) RECOURSE TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW OR CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITIONS OF THE
MEMBER STATES 333
C) OTHER LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 335
D) THE INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL LAW 335
VI. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 9 336
CHAPTER 10. BALANCING AS CONSTRUCTION 337
I. BALANCING IN PUBLIC LAW 338
1. BALANCING AS CONSTRUCTION 338
A) CONSTRUCTION OF OPEN CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 338
B) BALANCING AS A PROCESS TO SUBSTANTIATE CONFLICTING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
339
2. THE STRUCTURE OF BALANCING 341
A) THE BALANCING MANDATE AND SELECTION OF THE ASPECTS RELEVANT FOR
BALANCING 341
B) ABSTRACT WEIGHTING OF BALANCING ASPECTS 342
C) SPECIFIC WEIGHTING IN INDIVIDUAL CASES 342
D) BALANCING PROCESS IN INDIVIDUAL CASES 343
3. LEGAL DOCTRINAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE BALANCING 344
A) INTERMEDIATE LAYERS, STEPS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ETC 344
B) MANDATORY RULES OF PRECEDENCE 345
C) RULES OF PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF ARGUMENTATION 346
D) THE BALANCING RULE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 346
4. THE EXAMINATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A SUCCESSFUL CONSTRUCTION OF
LAW 347
II. BALANCING OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 348
1. THE OBJECTIVE SCOPE OF PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 348
2. INTERFERENCE AND RESTRICTIONS 350
3. JUSTIFYING THE INTERFERENCE (SCHRANKEN OR RESTRICTIONS) 351
4. LIMITS OF RESTRICTABILITY (SCHRANKEN-SCHRANKE), IN PARTICULAR
PROPORTIONALITY 353
XXII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III. BALANCING EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 357
1. COMPARISON OF THE SUBSTANTIATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
357
2. EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 358
A) SOURCES OF EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 358
B) JUSTIFYING THE RESTRICTION (SCHRANKEN) AND PROPORTIONALITY 359
3. EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS - DIFFERENCES TO GERMAN LAW 359
A) THE IDEA OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 359
B) LIMITATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION 360
C) PROPORTIONALITY 361
IV. BALANCING CONFLICTING LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN PRIVATE LAW 363
1. CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES IN PRIVATE LAW 363
A) PRECEDENCE OF ONE PRINCIPLE OVER ANOTHER 363
B) BALANCING OF CONFLICTING LEGAL INTERESTS IN PRIVATE LAW 365
2. BALANCING LEGAL PRINCIPLES USING THE EXAMPLE OF THE CONTRACT WITH
PROTECTIVE EFFECT IN
FAVOUR OF THIRD PARTIES AS A LEGAL CONCEPT OF CONFLICTING LEGAL
PRINCIPLES 365
A) CONDITIONS SIMILAR TO CONSTITUENT FACTS IN THE CASE LAW 365
B) ATTEMPTS AT LEGAL DOCTRINAL REASONING 366
C) THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISRUPTION AND CONTRACTUAL
FREEDOM 367
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN PRIVATE LAW 369
A) THE AFFIRMATIVE LEGAL VIEW 369
B) THE FUNDAMENTALLY OPPOSING LEGAL VIEW 370
C) MEDIATING VIEW: LIMITED APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE CIVIL
CODE 371
V. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 10 372
PART 4
PRIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW
CHAPTER 11. THE CONSTITUTION AS HIGHER-RANKING LAW 373
I. THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 374
1. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE BASIC LAW AS AN OBJECTIVE SET OF VALUES
374
A) RIGHTS OF DEFENCE AGAINST THE STATE 374
B) THE BASIC LAW AS AN OBJECTIVE SET OF VALUES 375
C) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS THE STATE S DUTY TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS 376
D) PROHIBITION AGAINST EXCESSIVE ACTION AND PROHIBITION AGAINST FAILING
TO TAKE ACTION.. 377
2. THE EFFECT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 378
A) DOCTRINE OF DIRECT THIRD-PARTY EFFECT 378
B) DOCTRINE OF INDIRECT THIRD-PARTY EFFECT 379
C) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS PROTECTIVE DUTIES 380
3. THE EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON CASE LAW 381
A) SPECIALIST COURTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 381
B) CONTROL BY THE CASE LAW 382
C) JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 100(1) OF THE BASIC LAW
383
II. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ARGUMENTS 384
1. INVALIDITY OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384
2. EXCEPTIONS FROM INVALIDITY 384
A) DECLARATION OF INCOMPATIBILITY AND ORDER OF TEMPORARY CONTINUATION OF
THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION 384
B) DUTY TO INTERPRET IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION 385
3. DISPUTED ARGUMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 386
A) THE IMPRECISE USE OF INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 386
B) THE TRIPARTITE DIVISION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION,
INTERPRETATION IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN
CONFORMITY WITH
THE CONSTITUTION 386
III. CONSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION 387
1. CONSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION AS AN INTERPRETATION CONCEPT
387
A) THE DISPUTE 387
XXIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
B) CONSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION AS A PURE FIGURE OF
ARGUMENTATION IN
PRIVATE LAW 388
2. CONSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION AS A SIMPLE BALANCING RULE
IN PRIVATE LAW 389
A) FREEDOM OF OWNERSHIP OF LANDLORDS VERSUS RIGHTS OF TENANTS 389
B) INTERFERENCE WITH COMPANIES VERSUS FREEDOM OF OPINION 389
IV. INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION 390
1. FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES REGARDING INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
CONSTITUTION 390
A) THE CONCEPT ACCORDING TO THE GUIDANCE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT 390
B) THE PRIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION AS AN INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION
CONCEPT 391
2. INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION IN PUBLIC LAW 392
3. INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE LAW 393
A) PROTECTING LEGAL INTERESTS 393
B) DEFENCE AGAINST EXCESSIVE RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM 393
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION 395
1. THE CONTRADICTORY CASE LAW OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 395
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION AS A LEGAL
CONCEPT 396
3. CASE GROUPS OF PERMISSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH
THE CONSTITUTION 397
A) TELEOLOGICAL REDUCTION 397
B) PROTECTION AGAINST OBVIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
AFFECTED PARTY... 398
C) PROTECTION OF OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 400
4. LIMITS TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE CASE OF
INFRINGEMENTS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BY THIRD PARTIES - THE DISPUTE OF
THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL SENATES 400
A) 2
ND
SENATE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW INDEPENDENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF
THIRD
PARTIES 401
B) 1
ST
SENATE: HIGH REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CASE OF
IMPAIRMENT OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS POSITIONS OF THIRD PARTIES 402
C) AUTHOR S VIEW: INADMISSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW CONTRA LEGEM ONLY
IN CASE OF
SEVERE IMPAIRMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE THIRD PARTY 403
VI. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 11 404
CHAPTER 12. THE PRIMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 406
I. DIRECT APPLICABILITY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR PRIMACY OF APPLICATION 407
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECT APPLICABILITY, PRIMACY OF
APPLICATION, AND INTERPRETA-
TION IN CONFORMITY WITH EUROPEAN LAW 407
2. DIRECT APPLICABILITY OR DIRECT EFFECT OF EUROPEAN LAW 408
A) PREREQUISITES FOR DIRECT EFFECT 408
B) PRIMACY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DIRECT EFFECT 409
3. THIRD-PARTY EFFECT OF PRIMARY LAW ON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 409
A) EXAMPLES OF DIRECT THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS ON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 409
B) DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECT AND PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS 410
C) COMBINING THEORY 411
II. PRIMACY OF APPLICATION AND THE OBLIGATION TO INTERPRET IN CONFORMITY
WITH UNION LAW.... 411
1. EUROPEAN TERMINOLOGY 411
2. THE TWO-STEP INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH PRIMARY LAW 412
A) INTERPRETATION OF DERIVED EUROPEAN LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH PRIMARY LAW
412
B) INTERPRETATION OF NATIONAL LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH PRIMARY LAW 412
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIMACY OF APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION IN
CONFORMITY
WITH UNION LAW 413
A) THE UNSPECIFIED LIMITS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN CONFORMITY WITH
PRIMARY LAW 413
B) NATIONAL CASE LAW ON FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY
WITH PRIMARY
LAW 414
III. SECONDARY LAW: REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES, RECOMMENDATIONS 416
1. PRIMACY EFFECT OF REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH
REGULATIONS 416
2. PRIMACY EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES AND BROAD INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE DIRECTIVE 416
A) VERTICAL EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES 416
B) LACK OF HORIZONTAL THIRD-PARTY EFFECT OF DIRECTIVES 418
3. NARROW HORIZONTAL INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DIRECTIVE 419
A) INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DIRECTIVE AS A PRESUMPTION RULE
419
XXIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
B) CHANGING TERMINOLOGY 421
4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DIRECTIVE 421
A) THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ECJ FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN
CONFORMITY
WITH THE DIRECTIVE 421
B) THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE
DIRECTIVE 423
C) THE AUTHOR S ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVE - DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN
CONFORMITY WITH
THE DIRECTIVE AS PART OF THE NATIONAL METHODOLOGY (RICHTLINIENKONFORME
RECHTSFORTBILDUNG AH TEIL DER NATIONALEN METHODENLEHRE) 425
AA) THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 425
BB) INTENT OF THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE 425
CC) IMPACT-ORIENTED CONSIDERATIONS 426
DD) ORDER OF CONSIDERATION 426
D) THE RECOGNITION OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
DIRECTIVE
THROUGH THE CASE LAW 428
E) THE CONTRA LEGEM BOUNDARY AS THE LIMIT TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN
CONFORMITY
WITH THE DIRECTIVE 430
5. FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES 432
A) PRIOR EFFECT 432
B) BEYOND THE SCOPE IMPLEMENTATION: DIRECTIVE-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION
VERSUS SPLIT
INTERPRETATION.., 433
6. DUTY OF REFERRAL AND SUBSIDIARY DUTY OF COMPLIANCE WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS 435
7. SUMMARY 436
IV. FURTHER MEANS OF ENFORCING EUROPEAN LAW 437
1. THE OBLIGATION TO CLEARLY TRANSPOSE EUROPEAN LAW 437
A) TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENT: THE OBLIGATION TO CLEARLY TRANSPOSE
DIRECTIVES 437
B) OBLIGATION TO ADAPT NATIONAL LAWS THAT CONTRAVENE EUROPEAN LAW 438
C) OBLIGATION TO EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT DIRECTIVES 439
2. PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE AND OBLIGATION TO REFER A PRELIMINARY
RULING ACCORDING
TO ARTICLE 267 OF THE TFEU 439
A) DUTY TO REFER AND ACTE CLAIR DOCTRINE 439
B) LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION TO REFER A
MATTER 440
3. THE STATE LIABILITY CLAIM UNDER EU LAW 440
A) DERIVATION AND APPLICABILITY 440
B) REQUIREMENTS AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 441
4. RECOVERY OF SUBSIDY UNLAWFUL UNDER EU LAW 442
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW 442
1. PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 442
2. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 443
3. APPRAISAL 444
VI. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 12 444
PART 5
PEACE UNDER THE LAW AND LEGAL CERTAINTY AS OBJECTIVES OF LEGAL
METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER 13. LIMITS TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 447
I. THE UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES OF PERMISSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 449
1. THE BOUNDARIES OF PERMISSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AS A PERMANENT
DISPUTE IN LEGAL
METHODOLOGY 449
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PERMISSIBLE OR IMPROPER DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
450
3. METHODOLOGICAL BLINDFOLD 450
A) AGAINST THE HIDDEN DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 450
B) UNCLEAR INDIVIDUAL MATTERS 451
4. DEFINITIONS OF THE LIMITS OF PERMISSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 452
A) PREVIOUS TERMS: LEGALLY IMMANENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW, DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW
THAT GOES BEYOND THE STATUTE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW CONTRA LEGEM
452
B) CASE LAW THAT FILLS A GAP, THAT SUBSTANTIATES THE STATUTE, THAT
REPLACES THE STATUTE, AND
THAT CORRECTS THE STATUTE 453
XXV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
C) REDEFINITION OF THE TERMS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW
CONTRA LEGEM 454
5. ARGUMENTS TO AVOID IMPROPER DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 455
II. FIRST STEP: TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS 455
1. CLARITY AND OPENNESS OF THE WORDING 456
2. WORKING ON THE SYSTEM - OMISSIONS AND THE CLOSED SYSTEM 456
A) CLOSED SYSTEM AND UNAUTHORISED MODIFICATION OF THE BASIC CONCEPT OF
THE
LEGISLATURE 456
B) PERMISSIBLE EXTENSIONS IN AN OPEN SYSTEM 458
3. THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE AND THE CHANGE IN LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES
REFLECTED IN THE LAW
(OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION) 459
A) RELEVANCE OF SUBJECTIVE INTENT 459
B) THE REACTION OF THE LEGISLATURE TO THE CASE LAW 459
C) POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS WHEN THE LEGISLATURE REMAINS SILENT 460
4. THE PURPOSE AS JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 460
A) THE PURPOSE OF THE NORM AS JUSTIFICATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
460
B) THE RELEVANCE OF CHANGED LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE APPLICATION OF
THE LAW 461
III. SECOND STEP: A GLIMPSE OF THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 461
1. IMPACT-ORIENTED CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 461
2. UNFAIR HARDSHIP WITH OBVIOUS LEGAL PROTECTION GAP AND INACTIVITY OF
THE LEGISLATURE 462
A) UNFAIR HARDNESS WITH OBVIOUS LEGAL PROTECTION GAP 462
B) THE INACTIVITY OF THE LEGISLATURE 463
C) NO OTHER LEGAL PROTECTION POSSIBLE 464
3. CONSENSUS, SUPPORT FROM COMPARATIVE LAW, AND INCREASE IN LEGAL
CERTAINTY 464
A) CONSENSUS AND GENERAL LEGAL CONVICTION 464
B) CONFIRMATION BY FOREIGN COURT DECISIONS 465
C) PRACTICABILITY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY 466
IV. THIRD STEP: THE CONSTITUTION AS HIGHER-RANKING LAW 467
1. PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE INJURED PARTY AND IMPAIRMENT
OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES 467
2. IMPAIRMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS 468
3. PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS WHERE THE CASE LAW CHANGES 470
4. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE CITIZEN S
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 470
V. FOURTH STEP: HIGHER-RANKING EUROPEAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 470
1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH PRIMARY LAW AND REGULATIONS
470
2. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL LAW IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DIRECTIVE AND ITS
LIMITS 471
3. INDIVIDUAL EXPECTATIONS AS A LIMIT TO PERMISSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAW 471
VI. FIFTH STEP: LIMITS TO COMPETENCES 471
1. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE LIMITS OF THE COURTS 472
A) SEPARATION OF POWERS, STATUTORY PRECEDENCE AND JUDICIAL
SELF-RESTRAINT 472
B) EXCEPTIONS 474
C) THE JUDGE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LEGISLATURE 474
D) IMPROPER JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AGAINST THE LEGISLATURE 475
2. RESERVATION OF THE POWER TO LEGISLATE AND THE COMPETENCE OF
PARLIAMENT 476
A) GENERAL RESERVATION OF STATUTORY POWERS AND MATERIALITY THEORY AT THE
EXPENSE OF
THE LEGISLATURE 476
B) NO RESERVATION OF POWERS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE COURTS 477
3. CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE COURTS 478
A) THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS A SUPER-APPEAL INSTANCE FROM
SPECIALISED
COURTS 479
B) THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN
THE COURTS .. 479
C) THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AS A COMPETENCE OF THE ECJ IN
DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW 482
4. SUBSTANTIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 483
A) LEGAL METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL DOCTRINE AS A MEANS OF SUBSTANTIATING THE
LAW 483
B) CONSTRUCTION AND LIMITS TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 484
VII. BALANCING AND WEIGHTING OF VARIOUS ARGUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 486
1. RULES OF PRECEDENCE, PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF ARGUMENTATION 486
XXVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. BALANCING RULES 486
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FIVE-STEP SYSTEM AND THE BALANCING RULES
486
VIII. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 13 488
CHAPTER 14. A MODERN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 489
I. THE PATH TO A MODERN METHODOLOGY 490
1. TRADITIONAL VERSUS POSTMODERN METHODOLOGY 490
2. A MODERN METHODOLOGY 490
II. EXTENSION OF LEGAL METHODOLOGY BY CASE HERMENEUTICS 491
1. THE INTERACTION OF FACTS AND LEGAL NORMS 492
A) PREVIOUS APPROACHES (ENGISCH, FIKENTSCHER) 492
B) THE NORM RANGE THEORY (NORMBEREICHTHEORIE) OF F. MULLER 492
2. HERMENEUTICS OF THE FACTS FOR DETERMINING THE CASE AREA 493
A) THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE HERMENEUTICS OF THE FACTS
{SACHVERHALTSHERMENEUTIK) 493
B) RAW FACTS AND DETERMINED FACTS: RESEARCH OBLIGATIONS AND INTERVIEWING
494
C) THE PRESENTATION OF FACTS BY THE COURTS 496
D) CASE HERMENEUTICS USING THE EXAMPLE OF A POTENTIAL BURQA BAN 498
3. THE NORM RANGE 501
A) ESTABLISHING NORMS IN THE DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT 501
B) OPINION 502
III. LEGAL CREATIVITY AND LEGAL THINKING 503
1. POSTMODERN METHODOLOGY: IDENTIFYING THE LAW VERSUS CREATING THE LAW
504
A) INNOVATIONS AND LEGAL DISCOVERIES 504
B) THE LIMITS OF THE SYSTEMATIC-DEDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF DECISIONS AND
BALANCING 505
C) DECISIONISM AND THE PARADOX OF DECISION-MAKING 505
2. LEGAL CREATIVITY - THE PROCESS OF DISCOVERY 506
3. TOPICS DOCTRINE AND LEGAL CREATIVITY 507
A) TOPICS DOCTRINE AS A STARTING POINT FOR FINDING SOLUTIONS 507
B) TOPOI AND LEGAL CREATIVITY 508
C) TOPOI, LEGAL DOCTRINE AND METHODOLOGY 509
D) TYPE THEORY 510
4. LEGAL THINKING AS PART OF MODERN METHODOLOGY 511
A) HOW TO DEAL WITH UNKNOWN PROBLEMS - THE CLAIM OF RATIONALITY OF
METHODOLOGY.... 511
B) THOUGHT STRUCTURES OF A MODERN METHODOLOGY 511
C) LIMITING CREATIVITY THROUGH METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 512
D) TRAINING LEGAL THOUGHT IN LEGAL EDUCATION 512
IV. SOURCES OF LEGAL METHODOLOGY 513
1. THE BASICS AS NEIGHBOURING DISCIPLINES 513
A) LEGAL HISTORY AND THE CHANGE OF LEGAL METHODS 513
B) COMPARATIVE LAW 515
C) LEGAL THEORY 515
D) LEGAL SOCIOLOGY 516
2. STATE THEORY, LEGAL DOCTRINE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 516
A) METHODOLOGY AS ARGUMENTATION AND LEGITIMATION THEORY 516
B) LEGAL DOCTRINE AND THE CONNECTION TO LEGAL METHODOLOGY 517
C) THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: IN SEARCH OF A FAIR DECISION 517
V. EXAMINATION SEQUENCE AND RANKING OF ARGUMENTATION CONCEPTS AS
BUILDING BLOCKS OF A
METAMETHODOLOGY 519
1. METHOD CHAOS AND PLURALISM OF METHODS 519
A) THE THEORY OF PRAGMATIC PLURALISM OF METHODS 519
B) CLAIM TO RATIONALITY THROUGH THE SPECIFICATION OF A MANDATORY
EXAMINATION
SEQUENCE 520
2. SIX EXAMINATION STEPS TO DETERMINE THE LEGAL SOLUTION 522
A) STEP ONE: HERMENEUTICS OF THE FACTS 522
B) STEP TWO: SAVIGNY S INTERPRETATION CANON AND IMPACT-ORIENTED
INTERPRETATION 522
C) STEP THREE: SUBSTANTIATION OF GENERAL CLAUSES 522
D) STEP FOUR: EXAMINATION OF HIGHER-RANKING LAW 522
E) STEP FIVE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS 523
F) STEP SIX: FAIRNESS CONTROL AND ACCURACY GUARANTEE 523
XXVII
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. THE FOURFOLD WEIGHTING OF THE FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 524
A) BINDING PRIORITY RULES 524
B) PRESUMPTION RULES 525
C) RULES OF BURDEN OF ARGUMENTATION 526
D) BALANCING RULE OF A BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM 527
4. CONCLUSIONS 528
A) EUROPEAN LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS AN OBJECTIVE OR A DIVERSITY OF
DIFFERENT LEGAL
METHODS 528
B) COMBINATION THEORY AND WEIGHTING 529
C) BEYOND THE SYSTEM AND SIMPLE DEDUCTION 530
VI. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 14 531
VII. THE VALUE OF JUDICIAL METHODOLOGY - A FINAL WORD 533
CHAPTER 15. CASES IN GREATER DEPTH 535
I. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AS A THEORY OF LEGITIMACY AND JUSTIFICATION 535
II. SOURCES OF LAW 535
III. SECONDARY SOURCES OF LAW AND SOURCES OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 536
IV. WORDING, SYSTEMATICS AND HISTORY AS TRADITIONAL METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION 537
V. TELOS, LOGIC AND IMPACT-ORIENTED INTERPRETATION 538
VI. TELEOLOGICAL COUNTER CONCEPTS AND SIMPLE FORMS OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
540
VII. SUBSTANTIATION OF THE LAW BY THE LEGISLATURE, THE ADMINISTRATION
AND THE COURTS 541
VIII. THE BEWEGLICHE SYSTEM, CASE GROUPS AND CASE GROUP COMPARISON AS
SUBSTANTIATION
METHODS 542
IX. LEGAL DOCTRINE AND GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES 543
X. BALANCING AS SUBSTANTIATION 544
XI. THE CONSTITUTION AS HIGHER-RANKING LAW 545
XII. THE PRIMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 545
XIII. LIMITS TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 547
XIV. A MODERN LEGAL METHODOLOGY 550
APPENDIX. SELECTED FIGURES OF ARGUMENTATION 551
TABLE OF CASES 557
DATABASES FOR GERMAN, EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN CASES 567
INDEX 569
XXVIII
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Möllers, Thomas M. J. 1962- |
| author2 | Mertens, Gill |
| author2_role | trl |
| author2_variant | g m gm |
| author_GND | (DE-588)121514579 (DE-588)114354174X |
| author_facet | Möllers, Thomas M. J. 1962- Mertens, Gill |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Möllers, Thomas M. J. 1962- |
| author_variant | t m j m tmj tmjm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046182406 |
| classification_rvk | PI 3000 PC 5720 PI 3010 |
| classification_tum | JUR 024 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1136376427 (DE-599)DNB1187363146 |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02274nam a2200577 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV046182406</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20200911 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">191002s2020 gw a||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="015" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">19,N23</subfield><subfield code="2">dnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="016" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1187363146</subfield><subfield code="2">DE-101</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783406743979</subfield><subfield code="c">Beck. Leinen : EUR 150.00 (DE)</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-406-74397-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781509938018</subfield><subfield code="c">Hart</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-5099-3801-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783848764044</subfield><subfield code="c">Nomos</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-8487-6404-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3406743978</subfield><subfield code="9">3-406-74397-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783406743979</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1136376427</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DNB1187363146</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">gw</subfield><subfield code="c">XA-DE-BY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PI 3000</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)136582:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PC 5720</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)135101:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PI 3010</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)136584:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">JUR 024</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">340</subfield><subfield code="2">sdnb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Möllers, Thomas M. J.</subfield><subfield code="d">1962-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)121514579</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="240" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Juristische Methodenlehre</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Legal methods</subfield><subfield code="b">how to work with legal arguments</subfield><subfield code="c">by Thomas M.J. Möllers ; translated by Gill Mertens</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">München</subfield><subfield code="b">C.H. Beck</subfield><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford</subfield><subfield code="b">Hart</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Baden-Baden</subfield><subfield code="b">Nomos</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XLIV, 584 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen, Diagramme</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm x 16 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Juristische Methodik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4114116-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Deutschland</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011882-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rechtstheorie</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Methodenlehre</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Europarecht</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4123623-3</subfield><subfield code="a">Lehrbuch</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Deutschland</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011882-4</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Juristische Methodik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4114116-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mertens, Gill</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)114354174X</subfield><subfield code="4">trl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Verlag C.H. Beck</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1023902869</subfield><subfield code="4">pbl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">SWB Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031561927&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031561927</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Lehrbuch |
| geographic | Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Deutschland |
| id | DE-604.BV046182406 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T18:45:20Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | (DE-588)1023902869 |
| isbn | 9783406743979 9781509938018 9783848764044 3406743978 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031561927 |
| oclc_num | 1136376427 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-703 DE-706 DE-M382 DE-384 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-29 DE-11 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-523 |
| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-706 DE-M382 DE-384 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-29 DE-11 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-523 |
| physical | XLIV, 584 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme 24 cm x 16 cm |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | C.H. Beck Hart Nomos |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Möllers, Thomas M. J. 1962- Legal methods how to work with legal arguments Juristische Methodik (DE-588)4114116-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4114116-7 (DE-588)4011882-4 (DE-588)4123623-3 |
| title | Legal methods how to work with legal arguments |
| title_alt | Juristische Methodenlehre |
| title_auth | Legal methods how to work with legal arguments |
| title_exact_search | Legal methods how to work with legal arguments |
| title_full | Legal methods how to work with legal arguments by Thomas M.J. Möllers ; translated by Gill Mertens |
| title_fullStr | Legal methods how to work with legal arguments by Thomas M.J. Möllers ; translated by Gill Mertens |
| title_full_unstemmed | Legal methods how to work with legal arguments by Thomas M.J. Möllers ; translated by Gill Mertens |
| title_short | Legal methods |
| title_sort | legal methods how to work with legal arguments |
| title_sub | how to work with legal arguments |
| topic | Juristische Methodik (DE-588)4114116-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Juristische Methodik Deutschland Lehrbuch |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031561927&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mollersthomasmj juristischemethodenlehre AT mertensgill juristischemethodenlehre AT verlagchbeck juristischemethodenlehre AT mollersthomasmj legalmethodshowtoworkwithlegalarguments AT mertensgill legalmethodshowtoworkwithlegalarguments AT verlagchbeck legalmethodshowtoworkwithlegalarguments |
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Paper/Kapitel scannen lassen
Paper/Kapitel scannen lassen
Teilbibliothek Stammgelände
| Signatur: |
0002 JUR 024 2020 A 3097
Lageplan |
|---|---|
| Exemplar 1 | Ausleihbar Am Standort |