Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse: Venezuela’s case
Gespeichert in:
Beteilige Person: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
Freie Universität Berlin
August 2019
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Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Economics
2019, 14 |
Schlagwörter: | |
Links: | https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/25601 |
Abstract: | The resource curse literature's main lesson is that developing and natural resource-rich countries should save most of their oil windfalls in foreign currency. Moreover, the political cycle literature's recent contributions predict stronger cycles in these countries. This paper investigates how political cycles might explain low oil windfall savings. Using Venezuela's case, the paper argues that power concentration during periods of oil price explosiveness leads to increased public investment in prestige projects aimed at increasing the incumbent's − or his party's − re-election probabilities. The article backs the argument analyzing the Chavista democratic period of 1999-2016. It also identifies parallels with Venezuela's 1970-1988 period |
Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten) Diagramme |
Internformat
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490 | 1 | |a Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics |v 2019, 14 |a Economics | |
520 | 3 | |a The resource curse literature's main lesson is that developing and natural resource-rich countries should save most of their oil windfalls in foreign currency. Moreover, the political cycle literature's recent contributions predict stronger cycles in these countries. This paper investigates how political cycles might explain low oil windfall savings. Using Venezuela's case, the paper argues that power concentration during periods of oil price explosiveness leads to increased public investment in prestige projects aimed at increasing the incumbent's − or his party's − re-election probabilities. The article backs the argument analyzing the Chavista democratic period of 1999-2016. It also identifies parallels with Venezuela's 1970-1988 period | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Márquez-Velázquez, Alejandro |
author_GND | (DE-588)1195197179 |
author_facet | Márquez-Velázquez, Alejandro |
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author_sort | Márquez-Velázquez, Alejandro |
author_variant | a m v amv |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV046167917 |
collection | ebook |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1120135164 (DE-599)BVBBV046167917 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
era | Geschichte 1970-1988 gnd Geschichte 1999-2016 gnd |
era_facet | Geschichte 1970-1988 Geschichte 1999-2016 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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geographic | Venezuela (DE-588)4062512-6 gnd |
geographic_facet | Venezuela |
id | DE-604.BV046167917 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-20T18:44:56Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031547747 |
oclc_num | 1120135164 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-188 |
owner_facet | DE-188 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten) Diagramme |
psigel | ebook |
publishDate | 2019 |
publishDateSearch | 2019 |
publishDateSort | 2019 |
publisher | Freie Universität Berlin |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Economics |
spelling | Márquez-Velázquez, Alejandro Verfasser (DE-588)1195197179 aut Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case Alejandro Márquez-Velázquez Berlin Freie Universität Berlin August 2019 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics 2019, 14 Economics The resource curse literature's main lesson is that developing and natural resource-rich countries should save most of their oil windfalls in foreign currency. Moreover, the political cycle literature's recent contributions predict stronger cycles in these countries. This paper investigates how political cycles might explain low oil windfall savings. Using Venezuela's case, the paper argues that power concentration during periods of oil price explosiveness leads to increased public investment in prestige projects aimed at increasing the incumbent's − or his party's − re-election probabilities. The article backs the argument analyzing the Chavista democratic period of 1999-2016. It also identifies parallels with Venezuela's 1970-1988 period Geschichte 1970-1988 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1999-2016 gnd rswk-swf political cycles oil windfalls resource curse Venezuela Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd rswk-swf Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd rswk-swf Erdölwirtschaft (DE-588)4152707-0 gnd rswk-swf Auslandsanlage (DE-588)4128578-5 gnd rswk-swf Gewinn (DE-588)4020903-9 gnd rswk-swf Venezuela (DE-588)4062512-6 gnd rswk-swf Venezuela (DE-588)4062512-6 g Erdölwirtschaft (DE-588)4152707-0 s Gewinn (DE-588)4020903-9 s Auslandsanlage (DE-588)4128578-5 s Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 s Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 s Geschichte 1970-1988 z Geschichte 1999-2016 z DE-188 Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Discussion paper 2019, 14 : Economics (DE-604)BV026641400 2019,14 https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/25601 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext Textdatei PDF 641,3 KB |
spellingShingle | Márquez-Velázquez, Alejandro Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case political cycles oil windfalls resource curse Venezuela Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd Erdölwirtschaft (DE-588)4152707-0 gnd Auslandsanlage (DE-588)4128578-5 gnd Gewinn (DE-588)4020903-9 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4064286-0 (DE-588)4049012-9 (DE-588)4152707-0 (DE-588)4128578-5 (DE-588)4020903-9 (DE-588)4062512-6 |
title | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case |
title_auth | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case |
title_exact_search | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case |
title_full | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case Alejandro Márquez-Velázquez |
title_fullStr | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case Alejandro Márquez-Velázquez |
title_full_unstemmed | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse Venezuela’s case Alejandro Márquez-Velázquez |
title_short | Developing countries' political cycles and the resource curse |
title_sort | developing countries political cycles and the resource curse venezuela s case |
title_sub | Venezuela’s case |
topic | political cycles oil windfalls resource curse Venezuela Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Regierung (DE-588)4049012-9 gnd Erdölwirtschaft (DE-588)4152707-0 gnd Auslandsanlage (DE-588)4128578-5 gnd Gewinn (DE-588)4020903-9 gnd |
topic_facet | political cycles oil windfalls resource curse Venezuela Wahl Regierung Erdölwirtschaft Auslandsanlage Gewinn |
url | https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/25601 |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV026641400 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT marquezvelazquezalejandro developingcountriespoliticalcyclesandtheresourcecursevenezuelascase |