Organizing Leviathan: politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government
Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruit...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2017
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| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822869 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822869 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822869 http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029855960&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Zusammenfassung: | Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 07 Jul 2017) |
| Umfang: | 1 online resource (x, 262 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781316822869 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781316822869 |
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| 520 | |a Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Government accountability | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1819266136757239808 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PAGE, VIII
1 WHY RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS MATTER 1
2 THEORY 13
3 A CLOSED WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY 54
4 CORRUPTION 89
5 EFFECTIVENESS 128
6 REFORMS 155
7 CONCLUSIONS 183
NOTES 204
REFERENCES 206
INDEX 242
VN
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Dahlström, Carl 1972- Lapuente Giné, Víctor 1976- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1030053693 (DE-588)1136599665 |
| author_facet | Dahlström, Carl 1972- Lapuente Giné, Víctor 1976- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Dahlström, Carl 1972- |
| author_variant | c d cd g v l gv gvl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV044455153 |
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| contents | Machine generated contents note: 1. Why relations between politicians and bureaucrats matter; 2. Theory; 3. A closed Weberian bureaucracy; 4. Corruption; 5. Effectiveness; 6. Reforms; 7. Conclusions |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781316822869 (OCoLC)995163065 (DE-599)BVBBV044455153 |
| dewey-full | 320.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| dewey-raw | 320.4 |
| dewey-search | 320.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3320.4 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/9781316822869 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV044455153 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T18:03:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781316822869 |
| language | English |
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| oclc_num | 995163065 |
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| physical | 1 online resource (x, 262 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2017 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| spellingShingle | Dahlström, Carl 1972- Lapuente Giné, Víctor 1976- Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government Machine generated contents note: 1. Why relations between politicians and bureaucrats matter; 2. Theory; 3. A closed Weberian bureaucracy; 4. Corruption; 5. Effectiveness; 6. Reforms; 7. Conclusions Bureaucracy / Evaluation Administrative agencies / Evaluation Executive departments / Evaluation Civil service Government executives Government accountability Political corruption Comparative government Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4008822-4 (DE-588)4063317-2 |
| title | Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government |
| title_auth | Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government |
| title_exact_search | Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government |
| title_full | Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente |
| title_fullStr | Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente |
| title_full_unstemmed | Organizing Leviathan politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente |
| title_short | Organizing Leviathan |
| title_sort | organizing leviathan politicians bureaucrats and the making of good government |
| title_sub | politicians, bureaucrats, and the making of good government |
| topic | Bureaucracy / Evaluation Administrative agencies / Evaluation Executive departments / Evaluation Civil service Government executives Government accountability Political corruption Comparative government Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Bureaucracy / Evaluation Administrative agencies / Evaluation Executive departments / Evaluation Civil service Government executives Government accountability Political corruption Comparative government Korruption Bürokratie Verwaltung |
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