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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Farrell, Henry 1970- (Author)
Format:	Electronic eBook
Language:	English
Published:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2009
Series:	Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Subjects:	Business networks / Italy / Case studies Business networks / Germany / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Italy / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Germany / Case studies Rational choice theory / Case studies Packaging machinery industry / Italy / Emilia-Romagna Machine-tool industry / Germany / Baden-Württemberg Mafia / Italy / Sicily Mafia Geschäftsverbindung Informelle Institution Netzwerkmanagement Strategische Allianz Vertrauen Industrie Deutschland Italien Sizilien Fallstudiensammlung
Links:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596933 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596933 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596933
Summary:	Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi
Item Description:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Physical Description:	1 online resource (xii, 239 pages)
ISBN:	9780511596933
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511596933

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genre	(DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content
genre_facet	Fallstudiensammlung
geographic	Deutschland Italien Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd Sizilien (DE-588)4055193-3 gnd Italien (DE-588)4027833-5 gnd
geographic_facet	Deutschland Italien Sizilien
id	DE-604.BV043920997
illustrated	Not Illustrated
indexdate	2025-01-11T17:41:14Z
institution	BVB
isbn	9780511596933
language	English
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330080
oclc_num	967406331
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG
owner_facet	DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG
physical	1 online resource (xii, 239 pages)
psigel	ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO
publishDate	2009
publishDateSearch	2009
publishDateSort	2009
publisher	Cambridge University Press
record_format	marc
series2	Cambridge studies in comparative politics
spelling	Farrell, Henry 1970- Verfasser aut The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany Henry Farrell Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2009 1 online resource (xii, 239 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in comparative politics Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi Business networks / Italy / Case studies Business networks / Germany / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Italy / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Germany / Case studies Rational choice theory / Case studies Packaging machinery industry / Italy / Emilia-Romagna Machine-tool industry / Germany / Baden-Württemberg Mafia / Italy / Sicily Mafia (DE-588)4036926-2 gnd rswk-swf Geschäftsverbindung (DE-588)4314530-9 gnd rswk-swf Informelle Institution (DE-588)4412578-1 gnd rswk-swf Netzwerkmanagement (DE-588)4245322-7 gnd rswk-swf Strategische Allianz (DE-588)4274322-9 gnd rswk-swf Vertrauen (DE-588)4063290-8 gnd rswk-swf Industrie (DE-588)4026779-9 gnd rswk-swf Deutschland Italien Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 gnd rswk-swf Sizilien (DE-588)4055193-3 gnd rswk-swf Italien (DE-588)4027833-5 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Deutschland (DE-588)4011882-4 g Industrie (DE-588)4026779-9 s Strategische Allianz (DE-588)4274322-9 s Netzwerkmanagement (DE-588)4245322-7 s Vertrauen (DE-588)4063290-8 s 1\p DE-604 Italien (DE-588)4027833-5 g 2\p DE-604 3\p DE-604 Geschäftsverbindung (DE-588)4314530-9 s 4\p DE-604 Sizilien (DE-588)4055193-3 g Mafia (DE-588)4036926-2 s Informelle Institution (DE-588)4412578-1 s 5\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-88649-9 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-1-107-40430-4 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596933 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 4\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 5\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk
spellingShingle	Farrell, Henry 1970- The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany Business networks / Italy / Case studies Business networks / Germany / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Italy / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Germany / Case studies Rational choice theory / Case studies Packaging machinery industry / Italy / Emilia-Romagna Machine-tool industry / Germany / Baden-Württemberg Mafia / Italy / Sicily Mafia (DE-588)4036926-2 gnd Geschäftsverbindung (DE-588)4314530-9 gnd Informelle Institution (DE-588)4412578-1 gnd Netzwerkmanagement (DE-588)4245322-7 gnd Strategische Allianz (DE-588)4274322-9 gnd Vertrauen (DE-588)4063290-8 gnd Industrie (DE-588)4026779-9 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4036926-2 (DE-588)4314530-9 (DE-588)4412578-1 (DE-588)4245322-7 (DE-588)4274322-9 (DE-588)4063290-8 (DE-588)4026779-9 (DE-588)4011882-4 (DE-588)4055193-3 (DE-588)4027833-5 (DE-588)4522595-3
title	The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany
title_auth	The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany
title_exact_search	The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany
title_full	The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany Henry Farrell
title_fullStr	The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany Henry Farrell
title_full_unstemmed	The political economy of trust institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany Henry Farrell
title_short	The political economy of trust
title_sort	the political economy of trust institutions interests and inter firm cooperation in italy and germany
title_sub	institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany
topic	Business networks / Italy / Case studies Business networks / Germany / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Italy / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Germany / Case studies Rational choice theory / Case studies Packaging machinery industry / Italy / Emilia-Romagna Machine-tool industry / Germany / Baden-Württemberg Mafia / Italy / Sicily Mafia (DE-588)4036926-2 gnd Geschäftsverbindung (DE-588)4314530-9 gnd Informelle Institution (DE-588)4412578-1 gnd Netzwerkmanagement (DE-588)4245322-7 gnd Strategische Allianz (DE-588)4274322-9 gnd Vertrauen (DE-588)4063290-8 gnd Industrie (DE-588)4026779-9 gnd
topic_facet	Business networks / Italy / Case studies Business networks / Germany / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Italy / Case studies Strategic alliances (Business) / Germany / Case studies Rational choice theory / Case studies Packaging machinery industry / Italy / Emilia-Romagna Machine-tool industry / Germany / Baden-Württemberg Mafia / Italy / Sicily Mafia Geschäftsverbindung Informelle Institution Netzwerkmanagement Strategische Allianz Vertrauen Industrie Deutschland Italien Sizilien Fallstudiensammlung
url	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596933
work_keys_str_mv	AT farrellhenry thepoliticaleconomyoftrustinstitutionsinterestsandinterfirmcooperationinitalyandgermany

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