Gespeichert in:
| Beteilige Person: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1999
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609312 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609312 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609312 |
| Zusammenfassung: | David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O'Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Umfang: | 1 online resource (xvi, 319 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511609312 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511609312 |
Internformat
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| 520 | |a David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O'Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1831357350762512384 |
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| adam_text | |
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| author | Epstein, David 1964- |
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| discipline | Politologie |
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| id | DE-604.BV043919070 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-05-06T08:01:09Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511609312 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029328150 |
| oclc_num | 967397500 |
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| series2 | Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| spelling | Epstein, David 1964- Verfasser aut Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1999 1 online resource (xvi, 319 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Political economy of institutions and decisions Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O'Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers Politik Delegation of powers Delegation of powers / United States / Case studies Transaction costs Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd rswk-swf Machtstruktur (DE-588)4246883-8 gnd rswk-swf Kompetenzdelegation (DE-588)4125548-3 gnd rswk-swf USA United States / Politics and government USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Kompetenzdelegation (DE-588)4125548-3 s Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 s 1\p DE-604 Machtstruktur (DE-588)4246883-8 s 2\p DE-604 O'Halloran, Sharyn 1963- Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-66020-4 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-66960-3 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609312 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Epstein, David 1964- Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers Politik Delegation of powers Delegation of powers / United States / Case studies Transaction costs Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd Machtstruktur (DE-588)4246883-8 gnd Kompetenzdelegation (DE-588)4125548-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4066493-4 (DE-588)4246883-8 (DE-588)4125548-3 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers |
| title_auth | Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers |
| title_exact_search | Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers |
| title_full | Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran |
| title_fullStr | Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran |
| title_full_unstemmed | Delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran |
| title_short | Delegating powers |
| title_sort | delegating powers a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers |
| title_sub | a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers |
| topic | Politik Delegation of powers Delegation of powers / United States / Case studies Transaction costs Wirtschaftspolitik (DE-588)4066493-4 gnd Machtstruktur (DE-588)4246883-8 gnd Kompetenzdelegation (DE-588)4125548-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Politik Delegation of powers Delegation of powers / United States / Case studies Transaction costs Wirtschaftspolitik Machtstruktur Kompetenzdelegation USA United States / Politics and government Fallstudiensammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609312 |
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