Reputational herding in financial markets: a laboratory experiment
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
München
CESifo
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper
5162 : Category 7, Monetary Policy and International Finance |
| Links: | https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5162.pdf |
| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource graph. Darst. |
| Format: | . - Acrobat Reader |
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| 490 | 1 | |a CESifo working paper |v 5162 : Category 7, Monetary Policy and International Finance | |
| 520 | 1 | |a We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment behavior, but not investors' ability types. Thereby, reputational incentives may arise endogenously. We find that a sizeable fraction of investors follows an established trend even in a setting where there are no reputational incentives. In a setting where there are reputational concerns, they do not seem to create substantial herd behavior. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| indexdate | 2024-12-20T17:22:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Roider, Andreas 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)12488122X aut Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment Andreas Roider ; Andrea Voskort München CESifo 2015 1 Online-Ressource graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier CESifo working paper 5162 : Category 7, Monetary Policy and International Finance We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment behavior, but not investors' ability types. Thereby, reputational incentives may arise endogenously. We find that a sizeable fraction of investors follows an established trend even in a setting where there are no reputational incentives. In a setting where there are reputational concerns, they do not seem to create substantial herd behavior. . - Acrobat Reader Voskort, Andrea Verfasser aut CESifo working paper 5162 : Category 7, Monetary Policy and International Finance (DE-604)BV014083264 5162 https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5162.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Roider, Andreas 1971- Voskort, Andrea Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment CESifo working paper |
| title | Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment |
| title_auth | Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment |
| title_exact_search | Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment |
| title_full | Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment Andreas Roider ; Andrea Voskort |
| title_fullStr | Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment Andreas Roider ; Andrea Voskort |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment Andreas Roider ; Andrea Voskort |
| title_short | Reputational herding in financial markets |
| title_sort | reputational herding in financial markets a laboratory experiment |
| title_sub | a laboratory experiment |
| url | https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5162.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV014083264 |
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