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Cover Image
Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity:
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jacoby, Hanan (Author), Mansuri, Ghazala (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C The World Bank 2007
Subjects:
Accounting
Adverse Selection
Communities & Human Settlement
Contract Law
Contracts
Debt Markets
E-Business
Economic Theory and Research
Effects
Efficiency
Equity
Family Labor
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Incentive Problems
Incentives
Information
Investment and Investment Climate
Labor Allocation
Labor Policies
Law and Development
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Monitoring
Municipal Housing and Land
Political Economy
Private Sector Development
Social Protections and Labor
Urban Development
Urban Housing
Links:http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4125
Item Description:Weitere Ausgabe: Jacoby, Hanan G : Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)
Staff View

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520 1 |a Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants 
534 |c 2007 
653 |a Accounting 
653 |a Adverse Selection 
653 |a Communities & Human Settlement 
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653 |a Finance and Financial Sector Development 
653 |a Incentive Problems 
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653 |a Information 
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653 |a Labor Allocation 
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653 |a Monitoring 
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653 |a Political Economy 
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653 |a Social Protections and Labor 
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653 |a Urban Housing 
700 1 |a Mansuri, Ghazala  |e Verfasser  |0 (DE-588)171568419  |4 aut 
776 0 8 |i Reproduktion von  |a Jacoby, Hanan G.  |t Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity  |d 2007 
856 4 0 |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4125  |x Verlag  |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers  |3 Volltext 
912 |a ZDB-1-WBA 
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Record in the Search Index

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physical 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)
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publishDate 2007
publishDateSearch 2007
publishDateSort 2007
publisher The World Bank
record_format marc
spellingShingle Jacoby, Hanan
Mansuri, Ghazala
Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
title Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
title_auth Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
title_exact_search Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
title_full Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity Jacoby, Hanan G
title_fullStr Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity Jacoby, Hanan G
title_full_unstemmed Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity Jacoby, Hanan G
title_short Incentives, Supervision, And Sharecropper Productivity
title_sort incentives supervision and sharecropper productivity
url http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4125
work_keys_str_mv AT jacobyhanan incentivessupervisionandsharecropperproductivity
AT mansurighazala incentivessupervisionandsharecropperproductivity
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