The Regulation of Entry:
Saved in:
Main Authors: | , , |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
|
Subjects: | |
Links: | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2661 |
Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten) |
Staff View
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV040617298 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 20250225 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 121206s1999 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093212453 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)874229169 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005448603 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-1102 |a DE-1051 |a DE-521 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 |a DE-522 |a DE-858 |a DE-573 |a DE-860 |a DE-1046 |a DE-1047 |a DE-Aug4 |a DE-2070s |a DE-M347 |a DE-1049 |a DE-898 |a DE-128 |a DE-M352 |a DE-70 |a DE-92 |a DE-150 |a DE-155 |a DE-22 |a DE-91 |a DE-384 |a DE-473 |a DE-19 |a DE-739 |a DE-20 |a DE-703 |a DE-706 |a DE-355 |a DE-29 |a DE-859 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-523 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Porta, Rafael |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a The Regulation of Entry |c Porta, Rafael |
264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 1999 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten) | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | 1 | |a August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper—a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses | |
534 | |c 1999 | ||
653 | |a Barriers To Entry | ||
653 | |a Economic Theories | ||
653 | |a Economic Theory and Research | ||
653 | |a Economies | ||
653 | |a Efficiency | ||
653 | |a Environment | ||
653 | |a Environmental Economics and Policies | ||
653 | |a Equity | ||
653 | |a Externalities | ||
653 | |a Information | ||
653 | |a Interest | ||
653 | |a Labor Policies | ||
653 | |a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth | ||
653 | |a Market Power | ||
653 | |a Markets | ||
653 | |a Need | ||
653 | |a Outcomes | ||
653 | |a Policies | ||
653 | |a Public Sector Economics and Finance | ||
653 | |a Public Sector Regulation | ||
653 | |a Regulatory Regimes | ||
653 | |a Social Protections and Labor | ||
700 | 1 | |a Shleifer, Andrei |d 1961- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124567495 |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Reproduktion von |a Porta, Rafael |t The Regulation of Entry |d 1999 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2661 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444797 |
Record in the Search Index
DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 1899714 |
---|---|
_version_ | 1825076270574075904 |
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Porta, Rafael Shleifer, Andrei 1961- Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon |
author_GND | (DE-588)124567495 |
author_facet | Porta, Rafael Shleifer, Andrei 1961- Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon |
author_role | aut aut aut |
author_sort | Porta, Rafael |
author_variant | r p rp a s as d l d s s dlds dldss |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV040617298 |
collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093212453 (OCoLC)874229169 (DE-599)GBVNLM005448603 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV040617298</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20250225</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">121206s1999 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093212453</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)874229169</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005448603</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1102</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1051</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-522</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-858</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1047</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-2070s</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1049</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-898</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-128</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M352</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-70</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-150</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-155</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-22</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Porta, Rafael</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Regulation of Entry</subfield><subfield code="c">Porta, Rafael</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper—a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="534" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="c">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Barriers To Entry</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Economic Theories</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Economic Theory and Research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Economies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Efficiency</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Environment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Environmental Economics and Policies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Equity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Externalities</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Information</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Interest</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Labor Policies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Macroeconomics and Economic Growth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Market Power</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Need</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Outcomes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Policies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public Sector Economics and Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public Sector Regulation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Regulatory Regimes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Social Protections and Labor</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Shleifer, Andrei</subfield><subfield code="d">1961-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124567495</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Reproduktion von</subfield><subfield code="a">Porta, Rafael</subfield><subfield code="t">The Regulation of Entry</subfield><subfield code="d">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2661</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444797</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV040617298 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2025-02-25T15:00:49Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444797 |
oclc_num | 874229169 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523 |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten) |
psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
publishDate | 1999 |
publishDateSearch | 1999 |
publishDateSort | 1999 |
publisher | The World Bank |
record_format | marc |
spellingShingle | Porta, Rafael Shleifer, Andrei 1961- Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon The Regulation of Entry |
title | The Regulation of Entry |
title_auth | The Regulation of Entry |
title_exact_search | The Regulation of Entry |
title_full | The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael |
title_fullStr | The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael |
title_full_unstemmed | The Regulation of Entry Porta, Rafael |
title_short | The Regulation of Entry |
title_sort | the regulation of entry |
url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2661 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT portarafael theregulationofentry AT shleiferandrei theregulationofentry AT silanesdelopezdjankovsimeon theregulationofentry |