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New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Clarke, George R. G. (Author), Groff, Alberto (Author), Walsh, Patrick Paul 1966- (Author), Keefer, Philip (Author), Beck, Thorsten 1967- (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C The World Bank 1999
Subjects:
Cabinet
Candidates
Constituents
Decision Makers
Decision Making
Democracy
E-Business
E-Government
Economic Theory and Research
Election
Election Data
Elections
Governance
Government
Industry
Information Security and Privacy
Legislation
Legislative Powers
Legislators
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Microfinance
Parliament
Parliamentary Government
Parliamentary Governments
Parliamentary Systems
Policy Making
Political System
Political Systems
Prime Minister
Private Sector Development
Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures
Technology Industry
Links:http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2283
Item Description:Weitere Ausgabe: Clarke, George : New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (52 Seiten)
Staff View

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520 1 |a February 2000 - Some say that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments. That result is not robust to the use of different variables from the Database of Political Institutions, a large new cross-country database that may illuminate many other issues affecting and affected by political institutions. This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: · Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances. · Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition. · Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy. 
520 1 |a [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the institutional bases of poverty alleviation and economic reform. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Database on Institutions for Government Decisionmaking (RPO 682-79). The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org, gclarke@worldbank.org, pkeefer@worldbank.org, or pwalsh@worldbank.org 
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653 |a Cabinet 
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653 |a Decision Makers 
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653 |a Prime Minister 
653 |a Private Sector Development 
653 |a Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures 
653 |a Technology Industry 
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700 1 |a Keefer, Philip  |e Verfasser  |0 (DE-588)171284356  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Beck, Thorsten  |d 1967-  |e Verfasser  |0 (DE-588)128773197  |4 aut 
776 0 8 |i Reproduktion von  |a Clarke, George  |t New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy  |d 1999 
856 4 0 |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2283  |x Verlag  |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers  |3 Volltext 
912 |a ZDB-1-WBA 
943 1 |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444421 

Record in the Search Index

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author Clarke, George R. G.
Groff, Alberto
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Keefer, Philip
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record_format marc
spellingShingle Clarke, George R. G.
Groff, Alberto
Walsh, Patrick Paul 1966-
Keefer, Philip
Beck, Thorsten 1967-
New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions
title New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions
title_auth New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions
title_exact_search New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions
title_full New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions Clarke, George
title_fullStr New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions Clarke, George
title_full_unstemmed New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy The Database of Political Institutions Clarke, George
title_short New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political Economy
title_sort new tools and new tests in comparative political economy the database of political institutions
title_sub The Database of Political Institutions
url http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2283
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AT walshpatrickpaul newtoolsandnewtestsincomparativepoliticaleconomythedatabaseofpoliticalinstitutions
AT keeferphilip newtoolsandnewtestsincomparativepoliticaleconomythedatabaseofpoliticalinstitutions
AT beckthorsten newtoolsandnewtestsincomparativepoliticaleconomythedatabaseofpoliticalinstitutions
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