Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies: Argentina and Brazil
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C
The World Bank
1999
|
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/927571468005477262/Fiscal-management-in-federal-democracies-Argentina-and-Brazil |
| Item Description: | Weitere Ausgabe: Webb, B. Steven : Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten) |
Staff View
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV040616762 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20241113 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 121206s1999 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093207093 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)874225616 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005443245 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-1102 |a DE-1051 |a DE-521 |a DE-863 |a DE-862 |a DE-522 |a DE-858 |a DE-573 |a DE-860 |a DE-1046 |a DE-1047 |a DE-Aug4 |a DE-2070s |a DE-M347 |a DE-1049 |a DE-898 |a DE-128 |a DE-M352 |a DE-70 |a DE-92 |a DE-150 |a DE-155 |a DE-22 |a DE-91 |a DE-384 |a DE-473 |a DE-19 |a DE-739 |a DE-20 |a DE-703 |a DE-706 |a DE-355 |a DE-29 |a DE-859 |a DE-Re13 |a DE-523 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Webb, B. Steven |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies |b Argentina and Brazil |c Webb, B. Steven |
| 264 | 1 | |a Washington, D.C |b The World Bank |c 1999 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Weitere Ausgabe: Webb, B. Steven : Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies | ||
| 520 | 1 | |a May 1999 - Argentina and Brazil-two of the most decentralized public sectors in Latin America and (along with Colombia and India) among the most decentralized democracies in the developing world-faced similar problems in the 1980s: excessive public deficits and high inflation exacerbated by subnational deficits. In the 1990s, Argentina was more successful at macroeconomic stabilization, partly because it imposed harder budget constraints on the public sector nationally and partly because it had stronger party control of both national legislators and subnational governments. In shifting to decentralized public finances, a country's central government faces certain fiscal management problems. First, during and soon after the transition, unless it reduces spending or increases its own tax resources, the central government tends to have higher deficits as it shifts fiscal resources to subnational governments through transfers, revenue sharing, or delegation of tax bases. Reducing spending is hard not only because cuts are always hard but because subnational governments might not take on expected tasks, leaving the central government with a legal or political obligation to continue spending for certain services. Second, after decentralization, the local or state government faces popular pressure to spend more and tax less, creating the tendency to run deficits. This tendency can be a problem if subnational governments and their creditors expect or rely on bailouts by the central government. Econometric evidence from 32 large industrial and developing countries indicates that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to greater national deficits. Dillinger and Webb investigate how, and how successfully, Argentina and Brazil dealt with these problems in the 1990s. | |
| 520 | 1 | |a [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] In both countries, subnational governments account for about half of public spending and are vigorous democracies in most (especially the largest) jurisdictions. The return to democracy in the 1980s revived and strengthened long-standing federal practices while weakening macroeconomic performance, resulting in unsustainable fiscal deficits, high inflation, sometimes hyperinflation, and low or negative growth. Occasional stabilization plans failed within a few years. Then Argentina (in 1991) and Brazil (in 1994) introduced successful stabilization plans. National issues were important in preventing and then bringing about macroeconomic stabilization, but so were intergovernmental fiscal relations and the fiscal management of subnational governments. State deficits and federal transfers were often out of control in the 1980s, contributing to national macroeconomic problems. Stabilization programs in the 1990s needed to establish control, and self-control, over subnational spending and borrowing. This paper-a product of Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is part of the LCR regional studies program on fiscal decentralization in Latin America. The authors may be contacted at wdillinger@worldbank.org or swebb@worldbank.org | |
| 534 | |c 1999 | ||
| 653 | |a Bailouts | ||
| 653 | |a Banks and Banking Reform | ||
| 653 | |a Creditors | ||
| 653 | |a Debt Markets | ||
| 653 | |a Deficits | ||
| 653 | |a Developing Countries | ||
| 653 | |a Domestic Debt | ||
| 653 | |a Emerging Markets | ||
| 653 | |a External Debts | ||
| 653 | |a Finance | ||
| 653 | |a Finance and Financial Sector Development | ||
| 653 | |a Financial Literacy | ||
| 653 | |a Fiscal Decentralization | ||
| 653 | |a Fiscal Deficits | ||
| 653 | |a Inflation | ||
| 653 | |a Interest | ||
| 653 | |a Levy | ||
| 653 | |a Macroeconomic Stabilization | ||
| 653 | |a Monetary Fund | ||
| 653 | |a Municipal Financial Management | ||
| 653 | |a Private Sector Development | ||
| 653 | |a Public Finances | ||
| 653 | |a Public Sector Deficits | ||
| 653 | |a Public Sector Economics and Finance | ||
| 653 | |a Public Spending | ||
| 653 | |a Public and Municipal Finance | ||
| 653 | |a Return | ||
| 653 | |a Revenue | ||
| 653 | |a Tax | ||
| 653 | |a Urban Development | ||
| 653 | |a Urban Economics | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Dillinger, William |d 1951- |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)171169107 |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Reproduktion von |a Webb, B. Steven |t Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies |d 1999 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/927571468005477262/Fiscal-management-in-federal-democracies-Argentina-and-Brazil |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444261 | |
Record in the Search Index
| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 1899178 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1821934579281297408 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Webb, B. Steven |
| author_GND | (DE-588)171169107 |
| author_facet | Webb, B. Steven |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Webb, B. Steven |
| author_variant | b s w bs bsw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV040616762 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093207093 (OCoLC)874225616 (DE-599)GBVNLM005443245 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV040616762</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20241113</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">121206s1999 xxu o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093207093</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)874225616</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005443245</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1102</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1051</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-522</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-858</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1047</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-2070s</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1049</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-898</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-128</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M352</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-70</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-150</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-155</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-22</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Webb, B. Steven</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies</subfield><subfield code="b">Argentina and Brazil</subfield><subfield code="c">Webb, B. Steven</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Washington, D.C</subfield><subfield code="b">The World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Weitere Ausgabe: Webb, B. Steven : Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">May 1999 - Argentina and Brazil-two of the most decentralized public sectors in Latin America and (along with Colombia and India) among the most decentralized democracies in the developing world-faced similar problems in the 1980s: excessive public deficits and high inflation exacerbated by subnational deficits. In the 1990s, Argentina was more successful at macroeconomic stabilization, partly because it imposed harder budget constraints on the public sector nationally and partly because it had stronger party control of both national legislators and subnational governments. In shifting to decentralized public finances, a country's central government faces certain fiscal management problems. First, during and soon after the transition, unless it reduces spending or increases its own tax resources, the central government tends to have higher deficits as it shifts fiscal resources to subnational governments through transfers, revenue sharing, or delegation of tax bases. Reducing spending is hard not only because cuts are always hard but because subnational governments might not take on expected tasks, leaving the central government with a legal or political obligation to continue spending for certain services. Second, after decentralization, the local or state government faces popular pressure to spend more and tax less, creating the tendency to run deficits. This tendency can be a problem if subnational governments and their creditors expect or rely on bailouts by the central government. Econometric evidence from 32 large industrial and developing countries indicates that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to greater national deficits. Dillinger and Webb investigate how, and how successfully, Argentina and Brazil dealt with these problems in the 1990s.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">[Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] In both countries, subnational governments account for about half of public spending and are vigorous democracies in most (especially the largest) jurisdictions. The return to democracy in the 1980s revived and strengthened long-standing federal practices while weakening macroeconomic performance, resulting in unsustainable fiscal deficits, high inflation, sometimes hyperinflation, and low or negative growth. Occasional stabilization plans failed within a few years. Then Argentina (in 1991) and Brazil (in 1994) introduced successful stabilization plans. National issues were important in preventing and then bringing about macroeconomic stabilization, but so were intergovernmental fiscal relations and the fiscal management of subnational governments. State deficits and federal transfers were often out of control in the 1980s, contributing to national macroeconomic problems. Stabilization programs in the 1990s needed to establish control, and self-control, over subnational spending and borrowing. This paper-a product of Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is part of the LCR regional studies program on fiscal decentralization in Latin America. The authors may be contacted at wdillinger@worldbank.org or swebb@worldbank.org</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="534" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="c">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bailouts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Banks and Banking Reform</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Creditors</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Debt Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Deficits</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Developing Countries</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Domestic Debt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Emerging Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">External Debts</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Finance and Financial Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Financial Literacy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fiscal Decentralization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fiscal Deficits</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Inflation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Interest</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Levy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Macroeconomic Stabilization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Monetary Fund</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Municipal Financial Management</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Private Sector Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public Finances</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public Sector Deficits</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public Sector Economics and Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public Spending</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Public and Municipal Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Return</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Revenue</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tax</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Urban Development</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Urban Economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Dillinger, William</subfield><subfield code="d">1951-</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)171169107</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Reproduktion von</subfield><subfield code="a">Webb, B. Steven</subfield><subfield code="t">Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies</subfield><subfield code="d">1999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/927571468005477262/Fiscal-management-in-federal-democracies-Argentina-and-Brazil</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444261</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV040616762 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-11T10:45:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-025444261 |
| oclc_num | 874225616 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-1102 DE-1051 DE-521 DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-522 DE-858 DE-573 DE-860 DE-1046 DE-1047 DE-Aug4 DE-2070s DE-M347 DE-1049 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-128 DE-M352 DE-70 DE-92 DE-150 DE-155 DE-BY-UBR DE-22 DE-BY-UBG DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-20 DE-703 DE-706 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-859 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR DE-523 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (43 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 1999 |
| publishDateSearch | 1999 |
| publishDateSort | 1999 |
| publisher | The World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Webb, B. Steven Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil |
| title | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil |
| title_auth | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil |
| title_exact_search | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil |
| title_full | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil Webb, B. Steven |
| title_fullStr | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil Webb, B. Steven |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil Webb, B. Steven |
| title_short | Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies |
| title_sort | fiscal management in federal democracies argentina and brazil |
| title_sub | Argentina and Brazil |
| url | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/927571468005477262/Fiscal-management-in-federal-democracies-Argentina-and-Brazil |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT webbbsteven fiscalmanagementinfederaldemocraciesargentinaandbrazil AT dillingerwilliam fiscalmanagementinfederaldemocraciesargentinaandbrazil |