Verfügbarkeit: Economics and management of organizations

Economics and management of organizations: co-ordination, motivation and strategy

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Beteilige Person:	Hendrikse, George W. J. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	London [u.a.] McGraw-Hill 2003
Schlagwörter:	Business economics Management
Links:	http://www.gbv.de/dms/hbz/toc/ht013646530.pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024837222&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
Umfang:	XX, 507 S. graph. Darst.
ISBN:	0077099923 9780077099923

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	Brief Table of Contents Part I; Positioning Introduction i Primer: Economic concepts for organization 2 Part II: Two Benchmarks Welfare theorem 3 Coase theorem 4 Part III: Complete contracts Principal-agent models 5 Hidden action problem 6 Hidden characteristics problem 7 Part IV: Incomplete contracts Transaction and influence costs 8 Ownership rights 9 Self-enforcing contracts 10 Part V: Business strategy Strategy typology 11 Part VI: Limited cognition Limited cognition and organization 12 Biases in decision-making 13 Part VII: Alignment Co-ordination 14 Complementarity 15 Detailed Table of Contents Preface xvi Acknowledgements xvii Part I: Positioning i 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Specialization and exchange 4 1.2 Co-ordination and motivation 5 Application: The diamond-water paradox 8 1.3 The importance of organizations compared with markets 10 1.4 Conclusion 12 1.5 Exercises 12 2 Primer: Economic concepts for organization 13 2.1 Economic analysis 14 2.1.1 Problem description 15 2.1.1.1 Players 15 2.1.1.2 Choice possibilities 15 2.1.1.3 Payoffs 16 2.1.1.4 Information structure 16 Application: Card games 16 2.1.1.5 Rules 17 2.1.2 Behavioural assumptions 18 2.1.2.1 Cognitive capacities and behavioural hypotheses 18 2.1.2.2 Classifying organization theories 21 2.1.3 Equilibrium 23 2.2 Game theory 26 2.2.1 Players 26 2.2.2 Actions/strategies 26 2.2.3 Payoffs 27 2.2.4 Equilibrium 29 2.2.5 Information structure 33 2.2.6 Rules 34 Application: Agenda manipulation (McKelvey theorem) 34 Application: Roman tradition 37 2.2.7 Conclusion 38 2.3 Management implications of game theory 38 2.3.1 Change the players 39 2.3.2 Change the choice possibilities 40 2.3.3 Change the payoffs 41 2.3.4 Change the information structure 42 2.3.5 Change the rules 44 2.4 Conclusion 44 2.5 Exercises 45 Part II: Two benchmarks 47 3 Welfare theorem 49 3.1 Introduction 50 3.2 General competitive equilibrium 50 3.3 Production function 54 3.4 Prices 56 3.4.1 Information and motivation 56 3.4.2 Law of one price 56 3.4.3 Price formation 57 3.4.4 Information structure 58 3.4.5 Robustness 58 3.5 Walrasian auctioneer 58 3.5.1 Communication structure 58 3.5.2 Decentralization 59 3.5.3 Co-ordination problems 60 3.5.4 Corruption 60 3.5.5 Honesty 61 3.5.6 Order of decisions 61 3.6 Contracts 61 3.7 Large number of consumers and producers 62 3.8 Complete rationality 62 3.9 Externalities 63 3.10 Conclusion 63 3.11 Exercises 63 4 COASE THEOREM 65 4.1 Introduction 66 4.2 Additional market for externalities 66 Application: Apples and bees 71 Application: The Golden Age/Industrial Revolution 73 4.3 Focus of the Coase theorem 74 4.3.1 Ownership structure 74 Application: Ownership structures regarding land 74 4.3.2 Number of producers and consumers 75 4.3.3 Decentralization 75 4.3.4 Institutions 76 4.3.5 Bargaining 76 4.4 Income effects 76 4.5 Bargaining problems 77 4.5.1 One-sided asymmetric information 77 Application: Allocation of bargaining power in the bidding process for a house 79 4.5.2 Two-sided asymmetric information 79 Application: Asymmetric information in the bidding process for a house 80 4.5.3 Multiple parties 80 Application: Public organizations 80 4.6 Property rights 81 Application: Ozone layer 81 Application: Corruption 82 4.7 Conclusion 83 4.8 Exercises 83 Part III: Complete contracts 87 5 Principal-agent models 89 5.1 Ingredients of the principal-agent problem 90 Application: Physician-patient relationship 91 5.1.1 Surplus available 91 5.1.2 Conflict of interests 91 5.1.3 Asymmetric information 92 5.2 Behavioural assumptions 93 5.2.1 Complete rationality 93 5.2.2 Opportunism 94 5.3 Sequence of decisions and information structure 94 5.3.1 Hidden action problem 95 5.3.2 Hidden characteristics problem 96 5.4 The profit-maximizing contract 97 5.4.1 Participation constraint 97 5.4.2 Incentive compatibility constraint 97 5.4.3 Equilibrium 97 5.5 The firm as a nexus of contracts 98 Application: Japanese versus American firms 99 5.6 Conclusion 102 5.7 Exercises 102 6 Hidden action problem 105 6.1 Contract design 106 6.1.1 Complete information 106 Application: Tonsils and open heart surgeries 109 Application: Limited liability and capital structure no Application: Subcontracting in Japan 113 6.1.2 Incomplete information 114 6.2 The incentive intensity principle 118 6.2.1 Risk aversion 121 6.2.2 Uncertainty regarding the environment 122 6.2.3 Profitability of incremental effort 122 6.2.4 Discretion regarding the choice of activities 122 Application: Team production and reward structure 122 Application: Seniority and mandatory retirement 123 Application: Capital structure 125 Application: Stockbrokers 128 6.3 Multiple dimensions 129 6.3.1 Equal compensation principle 129 Application: Reward structure and measurability of quality 132 Application: Cost versus profit centre 132 Application: Function design 132 Application: Working at home 133 Application: Stakeholder organization 134 6.3.2 Inaccurate performance measurement 135 Application: Team production 136 Application: Responsibility accounting 136 6.4 Generating additional information 137 6.4.1 The information intensity principle 137 Application: Yardstick competition 139 Application: Relative performance rewards 139 Application: Cars and electronics 141 Application: Salaries of top managers 141 Application: Delegation 141 Application: Internal labour market 142 Application: Organizing product development and maintenance 144 Application: Division of tasks 144 6.4.2 Monitoring intensity 145 Application: Dockworkers and accountants 146 6.4.3 The ratchet effect 146 Application: Job rotation 147 6.5 Entrepreneur as monitor 148 6.6 Conclusion 149 6.7 Exercises 150 Appendix 6.1: Expected utility theory 154 Appendix 6.2: The mathematics of the incentive intensity principle 155 7 Hidden characteristics problem 157 7.1 Design of the contract 158 7.1.1 Complete information 159 7.1.2 Incomplete information 161 Application: Used cars 163 Application: Loans 166 Application: Rigid salary structures 168 7.2 Selection not allowed 169 Application: Mandatory insurance 169 Application: Rationing 169 7.3 Self-selection 170 Application: Used cars and warranties 174 Application: Loans and collateral 175 Application: Education 176 Application: Piece-rate wages 177 Application: Seniority wages 177 7.4 Generating additional information 177 7.4.1 Signalling 178 Application: Education 178 Application: Dividend policy 179 Application: Non-informative advertising 180 Application: Strikes 180 Application: The unravelling principle of Grossman 180 Application: Leadership 181 7.4.2 Screening 182 Application: Entrance exams 182 Application: Credit history 183 7.5 Revelation principle 183 Application: Vickrey auction 187 7.6 Hidden characteristics and hidden actions 188 Application: Insurance 189 Application: Loans 189 Application: Herd behaviour and investment 189 Application: Internal labour market 191 Application: Equilibrium wages above the market clearing wage 191 Application: Safelite Glass Corporation 191 7.7 Conclusion 193 7.8 Exercises 194 Part IV: Incomplete contracts 199 8 Transaction and influence costs 203 8.1 Introduction 204 8.2 Specific investments 206 8.3 Transaction costs economics 211 Application: Coal mines and power generators 216 Application: Vertical integration in the car industry 216 Application: Organization of research in the pharmaceutical industry 217 Application: Granting licences 217 Application: Hostages 218 Application: Catering and transportation services 218 Application: Flexible production technologies 218 Application: Financial governance 219 Application: Marketing co-operatives 221 8.4 Measurement problems and bargaining costs 223 Application: Sales people 224 Application: Sales methods 224 8.5 Influence costs 226 8.5.1 Selective intervention 227 8.5.2 Problems of selective intervention 228 Application: Divestiture 229 8.5.3 Delegation 230 Application: Corruption 230 8.5.4 Delegation and bureaucracy 231 Application: Allocating personnel to aeroplane flight 233 Application: Rigid salary and promotion systems 233 Application: Operational and strategic decision processes 233 8.5.5 Delegation and competition 234 8.6 Coase theorem 234 8.7 Conclusion 235 8.8 Exercises 236 9 Ownership rights 241 9.1 Introduction 242 9.2 Governance structure 243 Application: Customer-grocer relationship 244 Application: Organizational structure 246 9.3 Specific and residual rights 248 Application: Publisher and author 248 Application: Truck ownership 249 Application: Insurance 249 9.4 Efficient allocation of ownership rights when one party invests 251 9.5 Efficient allocation of ownership rights when two parties invest 256 Application: Entrepreneur as monitor in team production 259 Application: Definition of vertical integration 260 Application: Insurance industry 261 Application: Franchise contracts and the product life cycle 262 Application: Franchise fees and royalties 263 Application: Capital structure 264 Application: Agricultural and horticultural co-operatives 266 Application: Majority decision-making 267 Application: Trucking 269 9.6 Extensions 270 9-6.1 Access 270 9.6.2 Multiple decisions 273 9.6.3 Complementary assets 275 9.7 Complexity 277 Application: The aerospace industry 278 Application: The automobile industry 279 Application: The building construction industry 280 9.8 Coase theorem 281 9.9 Conclusion 281 9.10 Exercises 283 Appendix 9: Cooperative game theory 284 10 Self-enforcing contracts 289 10.1 Introduction 290 10.2 Folk theorem 291 Application: Trust and the number of suppliers 295 Application: Team production 295 Application: Dispute prevention without courts in Vietnam 296 Application: Firm as reputation 297 Application: Capital structure and reputation 298 Application: Merchant guilds 298 10.3 Formal and real authority in organizations 299 iG.4 Self-enforcing contracts and asset ownership 301 10.5 Conclusion 303 10.(? Exercise 303 Part V: Business strategy 305 11 Strategy typology 309 11.1 Introduction 310 11.2 Decision sequence in the strategy taxonomy 311 11.3 Reaction functions 312 11.4 Properties of reaction functions 314 11.5 Strategy typology 319 11.6 Applications 326 Application: Strategic delegation 327 Application: Limited liability 329 Application: Vertical integration 331 Application: Licences and royalties 332 Application: Organizational structure 334 Application: Equity participation and joint ventures 335 .. 11.7 Conclusion 336 11.8 Exercises 336 Part VI: Limited cognition 339 12 Limited cognition and organization 344 12.1 Introduction 344 12.2 Why make bounded rationality explicit? 344 12.3 Deductive bounded cognition 345 Application: Diversification 347 Application: Price recognition 347 Application: Management accounting systems 348 Application: Agenda control 349 12.4 Inductive bounded cognition 351 12.4.1 Modularity 352 Application: British India 353 12.4.2 Self-organization 353 Application: Segregation 355 Application: The Game of Life 357 Application: A flock of birds 357 Application: 33c + 1 problem 358 12.5 Evolutionary approaches 360 12.5.1 Evolutionary psychology 360 Application: Calculating Bayesian probabilities 361 Application: Logic versus social interaction 361 12.5.2 Evolutionary economics 362 12.5.3 Population ecology 362 12.6 Type I versus type II errors 363 Application: Promotion policy 368 Application: Innovation 369 12.7 Conclusion 369 12.8 Exercises 369 13 Biases in decision-making 375 13.1 Introduction 376 13.2 Biases in decision-making 376 13.2.1 Economic theory versus daily practice 377 13.2.2 Tendencies in decision-making 378 13.3 Organizational responses 379 13.4 Short-term focus 380 13.4.1 Procrastination 380 13.4.2 Impulses and routines 381 13.4.3 Obedience 381 13.5 Shortsightedness 381 Application: Entrepreneurs versus managers 381 Application: Law of small numbers 382 Application: Financial markets 383 Application: Information cascading 383 Application: Diversity of teams 386 13.6 Loss aversion 387 Application: Spreading costs and revenues over time 390 Application: Presenting unattractive alternatives 390 Application: Equity premium puzzle 391 Application: Entry 392 13.7 Conclusion 393 13.8 Exercises 393 Part VII: Alignment 395 14 Co-ordination 399 14.1 Introduction 400 14.2 The co-ordination problem 400 14.2.1 More than one equilibrium 402 Application: Crossing an intersection 402 Application: Production and marketing 403 14.2.2 Solutions for the co-ordination problem 404 14.3 Generate additional information 405 14.3.1 Common background 405 Application: Driving on the left or right side of the road 405 Application: Quiz 406 Application: Organizational culture and labour contracts 407 Application: Organizational structure 407 Application: Strategic plan 408 14.3.2 Co-ordination mechanisms 408 Application: Orchestra 409 Application: Rowing boat 410 Application: Prices versus quantities 410 Application: Hierarchies versus polyarchies 415 14.4 Change the payoffs 416 Application: Collective health insurance 416 Application: Standardization 417 Application: Team theory 418 Application: Bounded cognition and information processing 420 14.5 Create one decision-maker 421 Application: Part-time working 421 14.6 Reduce the number of choices 422 14.6.1 Eliminate choice possibilities 422 Application: Working part-time 422 14.6.2 Imposing choices 422 Application: Dispatching taxis 423 Application: Democratic versus dictatorial decision-making 424 Application: Organization of research and development 424 Application: Traffic lights 424 14.7 Conclusion 425 14.8 Exercises 425 15 Complementarity 427 15.1 Introduction 428 15.2 The equal compensation principle 428 Application: The role of the head office 431 15.3 Law of large numbers 431 Application: Publishers 433 Application: Flexible production technology 434 Application: Restaurants 434 15.4 Orthogonality 434 15.4.1 Orthogonal information channels 434 15.4.2 Centralization and decentralization 435 15.5 Influence costs 438 15.6 Repeated interaction considerations 439 15.7 The costs of trade expansion 443 15.8 Stability of the environment 445 15.9 Organizational change 447 Application: Information technology and organizational transformation 447 15.10 Conclusion 449 15.11 Exercises 449 Glossary 45L Short answers to exercises 471 References 487 Index 497
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subject_GND	(DE-588)4507951-1 (DE-588)4037278-9
title	Economics and management of organizations co-ordination, motivation and strategy
title_auth	Economics and management of organizations co-ordination, motivation and strategy
title_exact_search	Economics and management of organizations co-ordination, motivation and strategy
title_full	Economics and management of organizations co-ordination, motivation and strategy George Hendrikse
title_fullStr	Economics and management of organizations co-ordination, motivation and strategy George Hendrikse
title_full_unstemmed	Economics and management of organizations co-ordination, motivation and strategy George Hendrikse
title_short	Economics and management of organizations
title_sort	economics and management of organizations co ordination motivation and strategy
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