The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design:
In this paper, we consider how the retirement age as well as a tax financed pension system ought to respond to a change in the standard deviation of the length of life. In a first best framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals; labor supply and retiremen...
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
München
CESifo
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working papers
3201 : Category 1, Public finance |
| Links: | http://www.ifo.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-publ/b3publwp/_wp_abstract?p_file_id=17900 http://www.ifo.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%202010/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%20October%202010/cesifo1_wp3201.pdf http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185192.PDF |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper, we consider how the retirement age as well as a tax financed pension system ought to respond to a change in the standard deviation of the length of life. In a first best framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals; labor supply and retirement-decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age and vice versa, if the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement; are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. A similar result follows in a second best setting, where the government raises revenue via a proportional tax (or pension fee) to finance a lump-sum benefit per year spent in retirement. We consider two versions of this model, one with a mandatory retirement age decided upon by the government and the other where the retirement age is a private decision-variable. -- uncertain lifetime ; retirement ; pension system |
| Umfang: | 24 S. |
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| 520 | 8 | |a In this paper, we consider how the retirement age as well as a tax financed pension system ought to respond to a change in the standard deviation of the length of life. In a first best framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals; labor supply and retirement-decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age and vice versa, if the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement; are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. A similar result follows in a second best setting, where the government raises revenue via a proportional tax (or pension fee) to finance a lump-sum benefit per year spent in retirement. We consider two versions of this model, one with a mandatory retirement age decided upon by the government and the other where the retirement age is a private decision-variable. -- uncertain lifetime ; retirement ; pension system | |
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| id | DE-604.BV036791471 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T14:42:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| series | CESifo working papers |
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| spelling | Aronsson, Thomas 1963- Verfasser (DE-588)123011817 aut The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design Thomas Aronsson ; Sören Blomquist München CESifo 2010 24 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 3201 : Category 1, Public finance In this paper, we consider how the retirement age as well as a tax financed pension system ought to respond to a change in the standard deviation of the length of life. In a first best framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals; labor supply and retirement-decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age and vice versa, if the preferences for the number of years spent in retirement; are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. A similar result follows in a second best setting, where the government raises revenue via a proportional tax (or pension fee) to finance a lump-sum benefit per year spent in retirement. We consider two versions of this model, one with a mandatory retirement age decided upon by the government and the other where the retirement age is a private decision-variable. -- uncertain lifetime ; retirement ; pension system Blomquist, Nils Sören 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)123011825 aut CESifo working papers 3201 : Category 1, Public finance (DE-604)BV013978326 3201 http://www.ifo.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-publ/b3publwp/_wp_abstract?p_file_id=17900 http://www.ifo.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%202010/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%20October%202010/cesifo1_wp3201.pdf kostenfrei Volltext http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185192.PDF Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Aronsson, Thomas 1963- Blomquist, Nils Sören 1948- The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design CESifo working papers |
| title | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design |
| title_auth | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design |
| title_exact_search | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design |
| title_full | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design Thomas Aronsson ; Sören Blomquist |
| title_fullStr | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design Thomas Aronsson ; Sören Blomquist |
| title_full_unstemmed | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design Thomas Aronsson ; Sören Blomquist |
| title_short | The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives, and optimal pension design |
| title_sort | the standard deviation of life length retirement incentives and optimal pension design |
| url | http://www.ifo.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-publ/b3publwp/_wp_abstract?p_file_id=17900 http://www.ifo.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%202010/CESifo%20Working%20Papers%20October%202010/cesifo1_wp3201.pdf http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185192.PDF |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
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