Industrial organization: competition, strategy, policy
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Harlow, England [u.a.]
Prentice Hall
2009
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| Edition: | 3. ed. |
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018618115&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Physical Description: | XXVI, 757 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780273710387 |
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| adam_text | Titel: Industrial organization
Autor: Lipczynski, John
Jahr: 2009
Preface xxiii
Acknowledgements xxvii
1 Industrial organization: an introduction 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Static and dynamic views of competition 4
1.3 The structure-conduct-performance paradigm 6
1.4 Strategic management: a short diversion 18
Discussion questions 21
Further reading 22
2 Production, costs, demand and profit maximization 23
2.1 Introduction 24
2.2 Production and costs 24
2.3 Demand, revenue, elasticity and profit maximization 40
2.4 Summary 50
Discussion questions 51
3 The neoclassical theory of the firm 53
3.1 Introduction 53
3.2 The neoclassical theory of the firm: historical
development 54
3.3 Theory of perfect competition and monopoly 56
3.4 Efficiency and welfare properties of perfect competition
and monopoly 62
3.5 Theory of monopolistic competition 67
3.6 Summary 70
Discussion questions 71
4 Managerial and behavioural theories of the firm 72
4.1 Introduction 72
4.2 Critique of the neoclassical theory of the firm 73
4.3 Separation of ownership from control: managerial theories
of the firm 76
4.4 The behavioural theory of the firm 87
4.5 Summary 89
Discussion questions 90
Further reading 90
5 Transaction costs, agency and resource-based
theories of the firm 91
5.1 Introduction 91
5.2 The Coasian firm 92
5.3 Transaction costs and the theory of the firm 96
5.4 Agency theory 100
5.5 Property rights and the theory of the firm 103
5.6 The resource-based theory of the firm 104
5.7 Summary 108
Discussion questions 110
Further reading 110
6 Oligopoly: non-collusive models 113
6.1 Introduction 114
6.2 Interdependence, conjectural variation, independent action
and collusion 115
6.3 Models of output determination in duopoly 116
6.4 Models of price determination in duopoly 128
6.5 The kinked demand curve and models of price leadership 132
6.6 Game theory 137
6.7 Summary 153
Discussion questions 154
Further reading 155
7 Oligopoly: collusive models 156
7.1 Introduction 156
7.2 Collusive action and collusive forms 157
7.3 Collusive institutions 159
7.4 Profit-maximizing models of price and output determination
for a cartel 163
7.5 Other motives for collusion 166
7.6 Factors conducive to cartel formation 169
7.7 Influences on cartel stability 175
7.8 Summary 184
Discussion questions 186
Further reading 186
8 Concentration: measurement and trends 187
8.1 Introduction 187
8.2 Market and industry definition 188
8.3 Official schemes for industry classification 191
8.4 Measures of seller concentration 195
8.5 Interpretation of concentration measures 211
8.6 Summary 212
Discussion questions 213
Further reading 213
9 Determinants of seller concentration 214
9.1 Introduction 214
9.2 Seller concentration: systematic determinants 215
9.3 The random growth hypothesis 222
9.4 Trends in concentration and the location of industry 231
9.5 Summary 247
Discussion questions 249
Further reading 250
10 Barriers to entry 251
10.1 Introduction 251
10.2 Types of barrier to entry 253
10.3 Entry-deterring strategies 262
10.4 Signalling commitment 268
10.5 Potential entry and contestability 272
10.6 Entry and industry evolution 274
10.7 Empirical evidence on entry 275
10.8 Summary 279
Discussion questions 280
Further reading 281
11 Market structure, firm strategy and performance 282
11.1 Introduction 282
11.2 Empirical tests of the SCP paradigm 283
11.3 Strategic groups 289
11.4 Sources of variation in profitability: industry, corporate
and business unit effects 291
11.5 The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 298
11.6 The persistence of profit 305
11.7 Summary 310
Discussion questions 311
Further reading 312
12 Pricing 315
12.1 Introduction 315
12.2 Cost plus pricing 316
12.3 Price discrimination 321
12.4 Peak-load pricing 337
12.5 Transfer pricing 340
12.6 Price dispersion 348
12.7 Summary 350
Discussion questions 352
Further reading 353
13 Auctions 354
13.1 Introduction 354
13.2 Auction formats and models of bidders valuations 356
13.3 The pure common value model and the winner s curse 357
13.4 Optimal bidding strategies and revenue equivalence in the
independent private values model 361
13.5 Extensions and additional topics in auction theory 368
13.6 Empirical evidence 373
13.7 Summary 380
Discussion questions 381
Further reading 382
14 Product differentiation 383
14.1 Introduction 383
14.2 Types of product differentiation 384
14.3 Monopolistic competition revisited: the socially optimal
amount of product differentiation 388
14.4 Lancaster s product characteristics model 390
14.5 Hotelling s location model 394
14.6 Salop s location model 409
14.7 Summary 412
Discussion questions 414
Further reading 415
15 Advertising 416
15.1 Introduction 416
15.2 Determinants of advertising expenditure 419
15.3 Advertising and product characteristics 429
15.4 Advertising and profit maximization 431
15.5 Advertising as a barrier to entry 436
15.6 Advertising, information search and quality signalling 438
15.7 Is there too much advertising? 442
15.8 Empirical evidence 445
15.9 Summary 452
Discussion questions 453
Further reading 454
16 Research and development 455
16.1 Introduction 455
16.2 Market structure, firm size and the pace of technological
change 456
16.3 Investment in research and development 471
16.4 Diffusion 476
16.5 Patents 485
16.6 Empirical evidence 490
16.7 Summary 495
Discussion questions 497
Further reading 498
17 Horizontal mergers and strategic alliances 499
17.1 Introduction 499
17.2 Profit-maximizing motives for horizontal mergers 501
17.3 Non-profit maximizing motives for horizontal mergers 506
17.4 Merger waves 511
17.5 Strategic alliances 513
17.6 Horizontal mergers: some empirical evidence 514
17.7 Summary 517
Discussion questions 518
Further reading 519
18 Vertical integration 520
18.1 Introduction 520
18.2 Motives for vertical integration: enhancement of market power 521
18.3 Motives for vertical integration: cost savings 528
18.4 Vertical disintegration 537
18.5 Empirical evidence on vertical integration 538
18.6 Agency and vertical relationships 540
18.7 Summary 546
Discussion questions 547
Further reading 548
19 Vertical restraints 549
19.1 Introduction 549
19.2 Motives for vertical restraints 550
19.3 Forms of vertical restraint 553
19.4 Summary 565
Discussion questions 565
Further reading 566
20 Diversification 567
20.1 Introduction 567
20.2 Types of diversification 568
20.3 Motives for diversification 570
20.4 Corporate focus and deconglomeration 580
20.5 Empirical evidence 583
20.6 Summary 587
Discussion questions 589
Further reading 590
21 Competition policy 593
21.1 Introduction 593
21.2 Competition policy: theoretical framework 594
21.3 Elements of competition policy 601
21.4 Implementation of competition policy 603
21.5 Summary 620
Discussion questions 622
Further reading 622
22 Regulation 623
22.1 Introduction 623
22.2 The problem of natural monopoly 624
22.3 Nationalization 628
22.4 Privatization 629
22.5 Forms of regulation 636
22.6 Regulation of UK privatized industries 642
22.7 Evaluation of regulation and deregulation 650
22.8 Franchising and competitive tendering 653
22.9 Summary 657
Discussion questions 659
Further reading 660
Appendix 1 Mathematical methods 665
Appendix 2 Econometric methods 687
Glossary 697
References 707
Index 743
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2.1 Short-run production and costs: numerical example 26
2.2 Demand, revenue, price elasticity and profit maximization:
numerical example 41
3.1 The neoclassical theory of the firm: typology of market structures 57
8.1 The UK s SIC 1980, by division 192
8.2 The UK s SIC 1992 and the EU s NACE, by section 193
8.3 The EU s NACE, by division 193
8.4 Comparison between the UK s SIC 1992 and the EU s NACE 195
8.5 Firm size distribution (sales data): six hypothetical industries 197
8.6 Seller concentration measures: six hypothetical industries 198
8.7 Calculation of three-, four- and five-firm concentration ratios 198
8.8 Calculation of Herfindahl-Hirschman and Hannah-Kay indexes 200
8.9 Calculation of entropy coefficient 202
8.10 Calculation of variance of logarithmic firm sizes 203
8.11 Calculation of Gini coefficient 206
9.1 Trends in seller concentration with random firm growth 225
9.2 Simulated evolution of industry structure and concentration under
the random growth hypothesis 226
9.3 Tests of the Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE): a selective review 228
9.4 Five-firm concentration ratios for UK business by industry
in 2004 234
9.5 Industrial structure of EU-27 excluding the financial sector, 2004 237
9.6 Firm size distributions for selected industries, EU, 1997
(distribution of sales by employment size class) 238
9.7 Specialization in European manufacturing 239
9.8 Largest and most specialized EU member countries in 2004 240
9.9 Location of EU science-based (S) and traditional (T) clusters 244
10.1 Economies of scale as a barrier to entry 254
11.1 Rates of return by size and concentration (weighted by assets) 288
11.2 Firm and industry effects in determining profitability 296
11.3 Summary of firm level persistence of profit studies 309
12.1 How UK firms set their prices 319
12.2 Price setting strategies of firms in the euro area 320
13.1 Relationship between N, the number of bidders, and d(N) 361
13.2 Optimal bidding strategies and revenue equivalence for the
independent private values model 367
15.1 Advertising as a percentage of gross domestic product
(at market prices) 420
15.2 Advertising-to-sales ratios of selected UK product groups, 2005 424
15.3 Top 10 advertisers and brands in the UK, 2006 426
16.1 UK innovation performance by EIS and other indicators, 2005 484
17.1 Characteristics of acquiring and target companies, 1980-98 510
19.1 Enhancement of market power through a price/profit squeeze 551
20.1 Measures of diversification, large EU manufacturing enterprises 586
22.1 Selected UK privatizations by industry and year of first sale 631
22.2 Privatized proceeds for OECD countries (US$ million) 632
22.3 Doing Business ranking for 2008 652
1.1 The structure-conduct-performance paradigm 7
1.2 Porter s five forces model 18
2.1 Short-run relationship between total, marginal and average
product of labour 27
2.2 Short-run total cost, marginal cost, average variable and
fixed cost, and short-run average cost 29
2.3 Increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale 30
2.4 Long-run average cost and long-run marginal cost 31
2.5 Short-run and long-run average cost functions 32
2.6 Isoquant and isocost functions 33
2.7 Surface area and volume of small and large storage tanks 35
2.8 Long-run average cost functions with constant returns to scale 39
2.9 Total, average and marginal revenue 42
3.1 Short-run pre-entry and post-entry equilibrium in perfect
competition 59
3.2 Long-run post-entry equilibrium in perfect competition 60
3.3 Long-run equilibrium in monopoly 61
3.4 Allocative inefficiency in monopoly 62
3.5 Monopoly and perfect competition compared 64
3.6 Allocative inefficiency and productive inefficiency in monopoly 65
3.7 Natural monopoly 67
3.8 Short-run pre-entry and post-entry equilibrium in monopolistic
competition 69
4.1 Baumol s sales revenue maximization model 81
4.2 Marris s growth maximization model 84
4.3 Williamson s managerial utility maximization model 86
5.1 Unitary or U-form organizational structure 98
5.2 Multidivisional or M-form organizational structure 99
5.3 The science of choice and the science of contract 100
6.1 Market average revenue, marginal revenue and marginal
cost functions, Cournot s duopoly model 117
6.2 The Cournot model: sequence of actions and reactions 117
6.3 Derivation of firm A s isoprofit curves 119
6.4 Firm A s isoprofit curves and reaction function 120
6.5 Cournot-Nash equilibrium 121
6.6 Cournot model: sequence of actions and reactions shown
using reaction functions 122
6.7 Cournot-Nash equilibrium and joint profit maximization 124
6.8 Cournot-Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibria 126
6.9 Equilibrium values of qA, qB, nA, 7iB: duopoly with linear
market demand and zero marginal cost 127
6.10 Equilibrium in the Bertrand duopoly model 129
6.11 Price-setting in the Edgeworth duopoly model 130
6.12 Sweezy s kinked demand curve model 133
6.13 Dominant firm price leadership 136
6.14 Payoff matrix for firms A and B 139
6.15 Payoff matrix for firms A and B: prisoner s dilemma example 140
6.16 Payoff matrix for Graeme and Brian: classic prisoner s dilemma 141
6.17 Isoprofit curves for firms A and B: Cournot-Nash versus
Chamberlin s prisoner s dilemma 142
6.18 Payoff matrix for firms A and B: Cournot-Nash versus
Chamberlin s prisoner s dilemma 143
6.19 Payoff matrix for the advertising budgets of firms A and B 145
6.20 Payoff matrix for firms A and B: mixed strategy example 146
6.21 Expected payoffs for firms A and B in mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium 147
6.22 Sequential game: strategic form representation 148
6.23 Sequential game: extensive form representation 149
7.1 Joint profit maximization in a three-firm cartel 163
7.2 Equilibrium with K cartel firms and N - K non-cartel firms 164
7.3 Osborne s model of cartel stability and instability 177
8.1 The Lorenz curve 205
9.1 The industry life cycle 218
9.2 Distribution of firm sizes 225
9.3 Diamond framework of competitive advantage 245
10.1 Economies of scale as a barrier to entry 253
10.2 Absolute cost advantage as a barrier to entry 254
10.3 Limit pricing to deter entry: absolute cost advantage 263
10.4 Limit pricing to deter entry: economies of scale 264
10.5 Sequential entry game 270
11.1 Effect of an increase in factor input prices on long-run post-entry
equilibrium in perfect competition 299
11.2 Effect of an increase in factor input prices on equilibrium in
monopoly 300
11.3 Short-run and long-run persistence of profit 308
12.1 First-degree price discrimination 323
12.2 Second-degree price discrimination (two-part tariff) 326
12.3 Third-degree price discrimination 328
12.4 Intertemporal price discrimination 333
12.5 Peak-load pricing: full capacity production in both periods 338
12.6 Peak-load pricing: spare capacity in off-peak period 339
12.7 Transfer pricing: no external market for intermediate product 341
12.8 Transfer pricing: profit maximization for the distributor 342
12.9 Transfer pricing: profit maximization for the producer 343
12.10 Transfer pricing: perfectly competitive external market
(price below P,) 344
12.11 Transfer pricing: perfectly competitive external market
(price above P^ 344
12.12 Transfer pricing: imperfectly competitive external market
(price above P,) 345
13.1 Bidding strategies: first price sealed bid auction (independent
private values model) 363
14.1 Monopolistic competition: too much product differentiation 389
14.2 Monopolistic competition: insufficient product differentiation 390
14.3 Lancaster s product characteristics model 391
14.4 Discontinuous demand function for brand C 393
14.5 Positioning of new brand B 394
14.6 Product characteristic space for breakfast cereals 395
14.7 Hotelling s location model with fixed prices and endogenous
locations 400
14.8 Hotelling s location model with fixed locations and endogenous
prices: joint profit maximization 402
14.9 Derivation of firm A s isoprofit curves 404
14.10 Firm A s reaction function 405
14.11 Hotelling s location model with fixed locations and endogenous
prices: Bertrand (or Nash) equilibrium 407
14.12 Hotelling s location model with fixed locations and endogenous
prices: summary of results 408
14.13 Salop s location model with three firms 410
14.14 Salop s location model: effect of changes in firm A s price with
three firms 410
14.15 Salop s location model: firm A s demand function 411
15.1 Advertising and profit maximization in monopoly 431
15.2 Advertising, market structure and concentration 436
15.3 Advertising response functions 437
15.4 Optimal search time 439
15.5 Welfare analysis of an increase in advertising expenditure in
monopoly 444
16.1 Arrow s incentive to innovate: small cost-saving innovation 461
16.2 Arrow s incentive to innovate: large cost-saving innovation 462
16.3 The optimal development time 464
16.4 Market structure and the optimal development time 465
16.5 Growth over time in the proportion of firms that have adopted an
innovation 477
16.6 Summary innovation index (Sll) and trends for EU and selected
countries 485
16.7 Welfare implications of patenting 487
17.1 Summary of mergers and acquisitions in the UK by UK companies:
by numbers 1963-2007 512
17.2 Alliances: a continuum of transactions 514
18.1 Competitive producers, competitive retailers 522
18.2 Competitive producers, monopoly retailer 523
18.3 Monopoly producer, competitive retailers 523
18.4 Monopoly producer, monopoly retailer 524
18.5 Input substitution following forward vertical integration 525
18.6 Backward vertical integration: case 1 526
18.7 Backward vertical integration: case 2 527
18.8 One seller, many buyers 533
18.9 Many sellers, one buyer 534
18.10 Vertical integration to avoid a sales tax 536
18.11 Robertson and Langlois two dimensions of integration 545
19.1 Exclusive contracts 558
21.1 Consumer and producer surplus: perfect competition versus
a monopolist with a cost advantage 596
A.1 Sample regression line for advertising-sales model 689
A.2 Regression models with different degrees of explanatory power 694
HH^^H List °f boxes
11.1 Measurement of company profitability 285
16.1 The pace of technological change: some international comparisons 483
1.1 Structure, conduct and performance in European banking 11
2.1 Economies of scale and hospitals in Scotland 37
2.2 The demand for spectator attendance at professional football 46
4.1 Bread and circuses from the Emperor Rupert: chairman s
pugnacious AGM performance 78
4.2 The Walt Disney crisis: rise of the corporate crusaders 80
5.1 Lessons from Railtrack: the collapse has demolished some of
the untested assumptions about outsourcing 94
5.2 Business schools share the blame for Enron 107
6.1 Power groups square up for price war 131
6.2 The prisoner s dilemma in practice: tit-for-tat in the First World War
trenches 151
7.1 The calorie club 159
7.2 Predicting cartels 182
8.1 The media concentration debate 206
8.2 Andersen s collapse results in a fee bonus for Big Four rivals 209
9.1 Industry life cycle for the credit union sector 220
9.2 Industrial clusters and competitive advantage 242
10.1 Legal barriers to entry in the UK 260
10.2 Predatory competition 266
10.3 Switching costs as a barrier to entry 269
12.1 Price discrimination in ticket price structures for English Premier
League football 329
12.2 Intertemporal price discrimination by book publishers 331
12.3 Metering price discrimination by cinemas 335
12.4 Tax avoidance through transfer pricing 347
13.1 The auction of the UK 3G mobile telephone spectrum licences 374
13.2 What determines the prices of goods traded in online auctions? 379
14.1 Planned obsolesence 387
14.2 Product differentiation at the movies 396
14.3 Hotelling in the air 397
15.1 For what it s worth, what s in a name? 422
15.2 Advertising campaigns 425
15.3 BT trials to track web surfers in search for better targeted adverts 427
16.1 Innovation with outsiders, the Tetra Pak experience 469
16.2 Sony points to technical revival with next-generation slim-line TV 472
16.3 Last gasp technologies 481
17.1 AT T lifted by synergies from merger 505
17.2 Microsoft steps up battle over Yahoo board 506
17.3 Cross-border bank mergers in Europe 507
18.1 Vertical reintegration 531
18.2 Maersk overturns key strategies on size and vertical integration 536
18.3 Sweet outlook for Krispy Kreme 543
19.1 The revival of price-fixing in the land of free enterprise 555
19.2 BSkyB and vertical restraints 563
20.1 Business strategy: Gucci and friends have all grown up 572
20.2 Citigroup offloads Diners Club 582
21.1 The Microsoft monopoly in the US 599
21.2 Well-dressed thieves 612
21.3 Oceans apart 616
22.1 Government and regulation 625
22.2 State media meddling is bad for all 643
22.3 Lack of wholesale competition blamed 646
22.4 Britain s utility model is broken 647
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Lipczynski, John |
| author_GND | (DE-588)139950516 (DE-588)129735639 (DE-588)128870869 |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| format | Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Aufsatzsammlung |
| id | DE-604.BV035758189 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:59:30Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780273710387 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2009012877 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-018618115 |
| oclc_num | 317252002 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-20 DE-634 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-20 DE-634 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | XXVI, 757 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Prentice Hall |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Lipczynski, John Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy Industrial organization (Economic theory) Produktpolitik (DE-588)4134655-5 gnd Industrieökonomie (DE-588)4133311-1 gnd Strategisches Management (DE-588)4124261-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4134655-5 (DE-588)4133311-1 (DE-588)4124261-0 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy |
| title_auth | Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy |
| title_exact_search | Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy |
| title_full | Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy John Lipczynski, John Wilson, and John Goddard |
| title_fullStr | Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy John Lipczynski, John Wilson, and John Goddard |
| title_full_unstemmed | Industrial organization competition, strategy, policy John Lipczynski, John Wilson, and John Goddard |
| title_short | Industrial organization |
| title_sort | industrial organization competition strategy policy |
| title_sub | competition, strategy, policy |
| topic | Industrial organization (Economic theory) Produktpolitik (DE-588)4134655-5 gnd Industrieökonomie (DE-588)4133311-1 gnd Strategisches Management (DE-588)4124261-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Industrial organization (Economic theory) Produktpolitik Industrieökonomie Strategisches Management Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018618115&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lipczynskijohn industrialorganizationcompetitionstrategypolicy AT wilsonjohnos industrialorganizationcompetitionstrategypolicy AT goddardjohn industrialorganizationcompetitionstrategypolicy |