From Wild West to the godfather: enforcement market structure
Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide co...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2001
|
| Series: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
8469 |
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8469.pdf |
| Summary: | Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers. |
| Physical Description: | 37 S. graph. Darst. |
Staff View
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| id | DE-604.BV035135409 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:21:02Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016802846 |
| oclc_num | 48048700 |
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| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 37 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateSearch | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Anderson, James E. 1943- Verfasser (DE-588)124786278 aut From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure James E. Anderson ; Oriana Bandiera Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001 37 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 8469 Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers. Geschichte Mafia History Right of property History Bandiera, Oriana Sonstige (DE-588)129523127 oth Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 8469 (DE-604)BV002801238 8469 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8469.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Anderson, James E. 1943- From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Geschichte Mafia History Right of property History |
| title | From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure |
| title_auth | From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure |
| title_exact_search | From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure |
| title_full | From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure James E. Anderson ; Oriana Bandiera |
| title_fullStr | From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure James E. Anderson ; Oriana Bandiera |
| title_full_unstemmed | From Wild West to the godfather enforcement market structure James E. Anderson ; Oriana Bandiera |
| title_short | From Wild West to the godfather |
| title_sort | from wild west to the godfather enforcement market structure |
| title_sub | enforcement market structure |
| topic | Geschichte Mafia History Right of property History |
| topic_facet | Geschichte Mafia History Right of property History |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8469.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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