Risk shifting versus risk management: investment policy in corporate pension plans
The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as go...
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Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
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Series: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13240 |
Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13240.pdf |
Summary: | The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in the cross-section and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among U.S. firms. |
Item Description: | Literaturverz. S. 36 - 39 |
Physical Description: | 60 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
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520 | 8 | |a The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in the cross-section and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among U.S. firms. | |
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illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:20Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
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physical | 60 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
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publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
spelling | Rauh, Joshua Verfasser (DE-588)129335347 aut Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans Joshua Rauh Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 60 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13240 Literaturverz. S. 36 - 39 The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in the cross-section and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among U.S. firms. Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13240 (DE-604)BV002801238 13240 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13240.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Rauh, Joshua Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans |
title | Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans |
title_auth | Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans |
title_exact_search | Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans |
title_full | Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans Joshua Rauh |
title_fullStr | Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans Joshua Rauh |
title_full_unstemmed | Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans Joshua Rauh |
title_short | Risk shifting versus risk management |
title_sort | risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans |
title_sub | investment policy in corporate pension plans |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13240.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT rauhjoshua riskshiftingversusriskmanagementinvestmentpolicyincorporatepensionplans |