The simple economics of extortion: evidence from trucking in Aceh
This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces, during which we directly observed over 6,000 il...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Series: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13145 |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13145.pdf |
| Summary: | This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces, during which we directly observed over 6,000 illegal payments to traffic police, military officers, and attendants at weigh stations. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of police and military checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments, finding evidence consistent with double-marginalization and hold-up along a chain of vertical monopolies. Furthermore, we document that the illegal nature of these payments does not prevent corrupt officials from extracting additional revenue using complex pricing schemes, including third-degree price discrimination and a menu of two-part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anti-corruption policy. |
| Item Description: | Literaturverz. S. 43 - 44 |
| Physical Description: | 57 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
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| 520 | 8 | |a This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces, during which we directly observed over 6,000 illegal payments to traffic police, military officers, and attendants at weigh stations. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of police and military checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments, finding evidence consistent with double-marginalization and hold-up along a chain of vertical monopolies. Furthermore, we document that the illegal nature of these payments does not prevent corrupt officials from extracting additional revenue using complex pricing schemes, including third-degree price discrimination and a menu of two-part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anti-corruption policy. | |
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| indexdate | 2024-12-20T13:23:19Z |
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| physical | 57 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Olken, Benjamin A. Verfasser (DE-588)130108731 aut The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh Benjamin A. Olken ; Patrick Barron Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 57 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13145 Literaturverz. S. 43 - 44 This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces, during which we directly observed over 6,000 illegal payments to traffic police, military officers, and attendants at weigh stations. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of police and military checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments, finding evidence consistent with double-marginalization and hold-up along a chain of vertical monopolies. Furthermore, we document that the illegal nature of these payments does not prevent corrupt officials from extracting additional revenue using complex pricing schemes, including third-degree price discrimination and a menu of two-part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anti-corruption policy. Barron, Patrick 1977- Verfasser (DE-588)133433048 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13145 (DE-604)BV002801238 13145 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13145.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Olken, Benjamin A. Barron, Patrick 1977- The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh |
| title | The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh |
| title_auth | The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh |
| title_exact_search | The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh |
| title_full | The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh Benjamin A. Olken ; Patrick Barron |
| title_fullStr | The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh Benjamin A. Olken ; Patrick Barron |
| title_full_unstemmed | The simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in Aceh Benjamin A. Olken ; Patrick Barron |
| title_short | The simple economics of extortion |
| title_sort | the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh |
| title_sub | evidence from trucking in Aceh |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13145.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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