Minorities and storable votes:
The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most imp...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
München
Ces
2005
München Ifo |
| Series: | CESifo Working paper
. 1583 : category 2, Public choice |
| Summary: | The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory. |
| Item Description: | Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo-group.de |
| Physical Description: | 42 S. graph. Darst. |
Staff View
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV021299913 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20060206 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 060119s2005 xx d||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)254940675 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV021299913 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-19 |a DE-12 |a DE-355 |a DE-706 | ||
| 084 | |a QB 910 |0 (DE-625)141231: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Casella, Alessandra |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124510620 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Minorities and storable votes |c Alessandra Casella ; Thomas Palfrey ; Raymond Riezman. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| 264 | 1 | |a München |b Ces |c 2005 | |
| 264 | 1 | |a München |b Ifo | |
| 300 | |a 42 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a CESifo Working paper |v . 1583 : category 2, Public choice | |
| 500 | |a Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo-group.de | ||
| 520 | 8 | |a The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Palfrey, Thomas R. |d 1953- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128832622 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Riezman, Raymond Glenn |d 1947- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)120255200 |4 aut | |
| 830 | 0 | |a CESifo Working paper |v . 1583 : category 2, Public choice |w (DE-604)BV013978326 |9 1583 | |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014620625 | |
Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1818962659153805312 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Casella, Alessandra Palfrey, Thomas R. 1953- Riezman, Raymond Glenn 1947- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124510620 (DE-588)128832622 (DE-588)120255200 |
| author_facet | Casella, Alessandra Palfrey, Thomas R. 1953- Riezman, Raymond Glenn 1947- |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Casella, Alessandra |
| author_variant | a c ac t r p tr trp r g r rg rgr |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV021299913 |
| classification_rvk | QB 910 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)254940675 (DE-599)BVBBV021299913 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02134nam a2200337 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV021299913</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20060206 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">060119s2005 xx d||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)254940675</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV021299913</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QB 910</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141231:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Casella, Alessandra</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124510620</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Minorities and storable votes</subfield><subfield code="c">Alessandra Casella ; Thomas Palfrey ; Raymond Riezman. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">München</subfield><subfield code="b">Ces</subfield><subfield code="c">2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">München</subfield><subfield code="b">Ifo</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">42 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CESifo Working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">. 1583 : category 2, Public choice</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo-group.de</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Palfrey, Thomas R.</subfield><subfield code="d">1953-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128832622</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Riezman, Raymond Glenn</subfield><subfield code="d">1947-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)120255200</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">CESifo Working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">. 1583 : category 2, Public choice</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV013978326</subfield><subfield code="9">1583</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014620625</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV021299913 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T12:32:50Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-014620625 |
| oclc_num | 254940675 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-706 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-706 |
| physical | 42 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Ces Ifo |
| record_format | marc |
| series | CESifo Working paper |
| series2 | CESifo Working paper |
| spelling | Casella, Alessandra Verfasser (DE-588)124510620 aut Minorities and storable votes Alessandra Casella ; Thomas Palfrey ; Raymond Riezman. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research München Ces 2005 München Ifo 42 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo Working paper . 1583 : category 2, Public choice Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com und www.CESifo-group.de The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory. Palfrey, Thomas R. 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)128832622 aut Riezman, Raymond Glenn 1947- Verfasser (DE-588)120255200 aut CESifo Working paper . 1583 : category 2, Public choice (DE-604)BV013978326 1583 |
| spellingShingle | Casella, Alessandra Palfrey, Thomas R. 1953- Riezman, Raymond Glenn 1947- Minorities and storable votes CESifo Working paper |
| title | Minorities and storable votes |
| title_auth | Minorities and storable votes |
| title_exact_search | Minorities and storable votes |
| title_full | Minorities and storable votes Alessandra Casella ; Thomas Palfrey ; Raymond Riezman. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_fullStr | Minorities and storable votes Alessandra Casella ; Thomas Palfrey ; Raymond Riezman. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_full_unstemmed | Minorities and storable votes Alessandra Casella ; Thomas Palfrey ; Raymond Riezman. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research |
| title_short | Minorities and storable votes |
| title_sort | minorities and storable votes |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT casellaalessandra minoritiesandstorablevotes AT palfreythomasr minoritiesandstorablevotes AT riezmanraymondglenn minoritiesandstorablevotes |