Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor: implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism
Gespeichert in:
| Beteiligte Personen: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Documented briefing
|
| Schlagwörter: | |
| Links: | http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.pdf |
| Abstract: | Revelations about A.Q. Khan's global nuclear marketing efforts and Osama bin Laden's contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists have raised concerns about terrorist acquisition of a nuclear or radiological weapons capability. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to U.S. national security and also to the security of the international system of nation-states. Looking across three case studies, this documented briefing concludes with a set of observations. First, access to significant resources, including the sanctuary of a state, will not guarantee the success of a nonstate actor's nuclear acquisition effort. Second, even sophisticated terrorists, searching for nuclear material, have been victims of scams. Third, Russian officials appear to have been less corrupt, and Russian nuclear materials and expertise more secure than many analysts in the West have alleged. Fourth, despite inspections and safeguards, the IAEA failed to prevent the loss of reactor fuel. Finally, the study suggests that strict control s on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise will reduce opportunities for terrorists to acquire these resources. |
| Umfang: | XI, 75 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 0833037617 |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a Revelations about A.Q. Khan's global nuclear marketing efforts and Osama bin Laden's contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists have raised concerns about terrorist acquisition of a nuclear or radiological weapons capability. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to U.S. national security and also to the security of the international system of nation-states. Looking across three case studies, this documented briefing concludes with a set of observations. First, access to significant resources, including the sanctuary of a state, will not guarantee the success of a nonstate actor's nuclear acquisition effort. Second, even sophisticated terrorists, searching for nuclear material, have been victims of scams. Third, Russian officials appear to have been less corrupt, and Russian nuclear materials and expertise more secure than many analysts in the West have alleged. Fourth, despite inspections and safeguards, the IAEA failed to prevent the loss of reactor fuel. Finally, the study suggests that strict control s on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise will reduce opportunities for terrorists to acquire these resources. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Daly, Sara A. Parachini, John Rosenau, William |
| author_facet | Daly, Sara A. Parachini, John Rosenau, William |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Daly, Sara A. |
| author_variant | s a d sa sad j p jp w r wr |
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| callnumber-sort | AS 236 |
| callnumber-subject | AS - Academies |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)60127433 (DE-599)BVBBV020826395 |
| dewey-full | 363.32 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 363 - Other social problems and services |
| dewey-raw | 363.32 |
| dewey-search | 363.32 |
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| discipline | Soziologie Politologie |
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| id | DE-604.BV020826395 |
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| spelling | Daly, Sara A. Verfasser aut Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation 2005 XI, 75 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Documented briefing Revelations about A.Q. Khan's global nuclear marketing efforts and Osama bin Laden's contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists have raised concerns about terrorist acquisition of a nuclear or radiological weapons capability. Such a capability would pose a grave danger to U.S. national security and also to the security of the international system of nation-states. Looking across three case studies, this documented briefing concludes with a set of observations. First, access to significant resources, including the sanctuary of a state, will not guarantee the success of a nonstate actor's nuclear acquisition effort. Second, even sophisticated terrorists, searching for nuclear material, have been victims of scams. Third, Russian officials appear to have been less corrupt, and Russian nuclear materials and expertise more secure than many analysts in the West have alleged. Fourth, despite inspections and safeguards, the IAEA failed to prevent the loss of reactor fuel. Finally, the study suggests that strict control s on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise will reduce opportunities for terrorists to acquire these resources. Oumu Shinrikyō (Religious organization) Qaida (Organization) al-Qaida (DE-588)4666782-9 gnd rswk-swf Aum-Shinri-Kyo-Sekte (DE-588)4404387-9 gnd rswk-swf Terrorismus Cults Japan Nuclear reactors Nuclear terrorism United States Prevention Security, International Terrorism Terrorism Prevention Terrorists Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd rswk-swf Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 gnd rswk-swf Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd rswk-swf USA Aum-Shinri-Kyo-Sekte (DE-588)4404387-9 b al-Qaida (DE-588)4666782-9 b Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 s Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 s Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 s DE-604 Parachini, John Verfasser aut Rosenau, William Verfasser aut http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Daly, Sara A. Parachini, John Rosenau, William Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism Oumu Shinrikyō (Religious organization) Qaida (Organization) al-Qaida (DE-588)4666782-9 gnd Aum-Shinri-Kyo-Sekte (DE-588)4404387-9 gnd Terrorismus Cults Japan Nuclear reactors Nuclear terrorism United States Prevention Security, International Terrorism Terrorism Prevention Terrorists Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 gnd Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4666782-9 (DE-588)4404387-9 (DE-588)4003434-3 (DE-588)4309759-5 (DE-588)4059534-1 |
| title | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism |
| title_auth | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism |
| title_exact_search | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism |
| title_full | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau |
| title_fullStr | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau |
| title_full_unstemmed | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism Sara Daly, John Parachini, William Rosenau |
| title_short | Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa reactor |
| title_sort | aum shinrikyo al qaeda and the kinshasa reactor implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism |
| title_sub | implications of three case studies for combating nuclear terrorism |
| topic | Oumu Shinrikyō (Religious organization) Qaida (Organization) al-Qaida (DE-588)4666782-9 gnd Aum-Shinri-Kyo-Sekte (DE-588)4404387-9 gnd Terrorismus Cults Japan Nuclear reactors Nuclear terrorism United States Prevention Security, International Terrorism Terrorism Prevention Terrorists Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Proliferation Militär (DE-588)4309759-5 gnd Terrorismus (DE-588)4059534-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Oumu Shinrikyō (Religious organization) Qaida (Organization) al-Qaida Aum-Shinri-Kyo-Sekte Terrorismus Cults Japan Nuclear reactors Nuclear terrorism United States Prevention Security, International Terrorism Terrorism Prevention Terrorists Kernwaffe Proliferation Militär USA |
| url | http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.pdf |
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