A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation:
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Series: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11083 |
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11083.pdf |
| Abstract: | "We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Physical Description: | 42 S. |
Staff View
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| 520 | 3 | |a "We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV019889704 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T12:08:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-013213732 |
| oclc_num | 57703157 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-703 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 42 S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)128378166 aut A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation Andrew Atkeson ; Harold L. Cole Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 42 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11083 "We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Corporations Finance Econometric models Cole, Harold L. 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)129754153 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11083 (DE-604)BV002801238 11083 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11083.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Atkeson, Andrew 1961- Cole, Harold L. 1957- A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Corporations Finance Econometric models |
| title | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation |
| title_auth | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation |
| title_exact_search | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation |
| title_full | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation Andrew Atkeson ; Harold L. Cole |
| title_fullStr | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation Andrew Atkeson ; Harold L. Cole |
| title_full_unstemmed | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation Andrew Atkeson ; Harold L. Cole |
| title_short | A dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation |
| title_sort | a dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Corporations Finance Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Corporations Finance Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11083.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT atkesonandrew adynamictheoryofoptimalcapitalstructureandexecutivecompensation AT coleharoldl adynamictheoryofoptimalcapitalstructureandexecutivecompensation |