Economic backwardness in political perspective:
We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, polit...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, MA
National Bureau of Economic Research
2002
|
| Series: | NBER working paper series
8831 |
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8831.pdf |
| Summary: | We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. |
| Physical Description: | 49 S. graph. Darst. |
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| 520 | |a We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. | ||
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| indexdate | 2025-02-06T15:01:43Z |
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| language | English |
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| physical | 49 S. graph. Darst. |
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| spelling | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)124929575 aut Economic backwardness in political perspective Daron Acemoglu ; James A. Robinson Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 49 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper series 8831 We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the U.S. industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. Geschichte Wirtschaftsentwicklung Aristocracy (Political science) Economic development History Elite (Social sciences) Attitudes Industrialization History Social change Robinson, James Alan 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128970006 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe NBER working paper series 8831 (DE-604)BV002801238 8831 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8831.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Robinson, James Alan 1960- Economic backwardness in political perspective NBER working paper series Geschichte Wirtschaftsentwicklung Aristocracy (Political science) Economic development History Elite (Social sciences) Attitudes Industrialization History Social change |
| title | Economic backwardness in political perspective |
| title_auth | Economic backwardness in political perspective |
| title_exact_search | Economic backwardness in political perspective |
| title_full | Economic backwardness in political perspective Daron Acemoglu ; James A. Robinson |
| title_fullStr | Economic backwardness in political perspective Daron Acemoglu ; James A. Robinson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Economic backwardness in political perspective Daron Acemoglu ; James A. Robinson |
| title_short | Economic backwardness in political perspective |
| title_sort | economic backwardness in political perspective |
| topic | Geschichte Wirtschaftsentwicklung Aristocracy (Political science) Economic development History Elite (Social sciences) Attitudes Industrialization History Social change |
| topic_facet | Geschichte Wirtschaftsentwicklung Aristocracy (Political science) Economic development History Elite (Social sciences) Attitudes Industrialization History Social change |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8831.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron economicbackwardnessinpoliticalperspective AT robinsonjamesalan economicbackwardnessinpoliticalperspective |