Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1997
|
| Series: | NBER working paper series
6304 |
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6304.pdf |
| Abstract: | In 1839, the French government purchased the patent on the Daguerreotype process and placed it in the public domain. This paper examines a mechanism under which governments would use an auction to estimate the private value of patents and then offer to buy out patents at this private value, times a fixed markup. The markup would correspond to the estimated typical ratio of the social and private values of inventions -- perhaps two. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their valuations patents would be sold to the highest bidder. Such patent buy-outs could eliminate monopoly price distortions and incentives for wasteful reverse engineering, while raising private incentives for original research closer to their social value. However, patent buy-outs are potentially vulnerable to collusion. Patent buy-outs may be particularly appropriate for pharmaceuticals. |
| Physical Description: | 54 S. graph. Darst. |
Staff View
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| 520 | 3 | |a In 1839, the French government purchased the patent on the Daguerreotype process and placed it in the public domain. This paper examines a mechanism under which governments would use an auction to estimate the private value of patents and then offer to buy out patents at this private value, times a fixed markup. The markup would correspond to the estimated typical ratio of the social and private values of inventions -- perhaps two. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their valuations patents would be sold to the highest bidder. Such patent buy-outs could eliminate monopoly price distortions and incentives for wasteful reverse engineering, while raising private incentives for original research closer to their social value. However, patent buy-outs are potentially vulnerable to collusion. Patent buy-outs may be particularly appropriate for pharmaceuticals. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV011804195 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T10:18:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-007969675 |
| oclc_num | 38292151 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-521 |
| physical | 54 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1997 |
| publishDateSearch | 1997 |
| publishDateSort | 1997 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | NBER working paper series |
| series2 | NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Kremer, Michael 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)128650532 aut Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation Michael Kremer Cambridge, Mass. 1997 54 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper series 6304 In 1839, the French government purchased the patent on the Daguerreotype process and placed it in the public domain. This paper examines a mechanism under which governments would use an auction to estimate the private value of patents and then offer to buy out patents at this private value, times a fixed markup. The markup would correspond to the estimated typical ratio of the social and private values of inventions -- perhaps two. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their valuations patents would be sold to the highest bidder. Such patent buy-outs could eliminate monopoly price distortions and incentives for wasteful reverse engineering, while raising private incentives for original research closer to their social value. However, patent buy-outs are potentially vulnerable to collusion. Patent buy-outs may be particularly appropriate for pharmaceuticals. Politik Inventions Government policy Patents Government policy Patents Purchasing Patents Valuation Public domain (Copyright law) Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe NBER working paper series 6304 (DE-604)BV002801238 6304 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6304.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kremer, Michael 1964- Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation NBER working paper series Politik Inventions Government policy Patents Government policy Patents Purchasing Patents Valuation Public domain (Copyright law) |
| title | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation |
| title_auth | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation |
| title_exact_search | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation |
| title_full | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation Michael Kremer |
| title_fullStr | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation Michael Kremer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation Michael Kremer |
| title_short | Patent buy-outs: a mechanism for encouraging innovation |
| title_sort | patent buy outs a mechanism for encouraging innovation |
| topic | Politik Inventions Government policy Patents Government policy Patents Purchasing Patents Valuation Public domain (Copyright law) |
| topic_facet | Politik Inventions Government policy Patents Government policy Patents Purchasing Patents Valuation Public domain (Copyright law) |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6304.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kremermichael patentbuyoutsamechanismforencouraginginnovation |