Game theory:
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. u.a.
MIT Press
1992
|
| Edition: | 2. print. |
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002968887&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002968887&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Item Description: | Literaturangaben |
| Physical Description: | XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262061414 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game theory |c Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1819351865716899840 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Titel: Game theory
Autor: Fudenberg, Drew
Jahr: 1992
Contents
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction xvii
I Static Games of Complete Information 1
1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium 3
1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance 4
1.1.1 Strategic-Form Games 4
1.1.2 Dominated Strategies 6
1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies 9
1.2 Nash Equilibrium 11
1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium 11
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria 14
1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium 16
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto
Optimality 18
1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or
Evolution 23
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria 29
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 29
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a
Closed Graph 30
1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games
with Continuous Payoffs 34
Exercises 36
References 42
2 Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium 45
2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability 45
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and
Properties 45
2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance 47
2.1.3 Rationalizability 48
2.1.4 Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance 50
2.1.5 Discussion 53
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium 53
2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria 59
Exercises 60
References 63
viii Contents
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information 65
3 Extensive-Form Games 67
3.1 Introduction 67
3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with 70
Observed Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game? 70
3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 72
3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and Time Consistency 74
3.3 The Extensive Form 77
3.3.1 Definition 77
3.3.2 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions 82
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games 83
3.4.1 Behavior Strategies 83
3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-
Form Games 85
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall 87
3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium 90
3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 92
3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 96
3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction 97
3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection 99
Exercises 100
References 105
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed
Actions 107
4.1 Introduction 107
4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection 108
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games 110
4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma 110
4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria 112
4.4 The Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining Model 113
4.4.1 A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 113
4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium 115
4.4.3 Comparative Statics 116
4.5 Simple Timing Games 117
4.5.1 Definition of Simple Timing Games 117
4.5.2 The War of Attrition 120
4.5.3 Preemption Games 126
Contents ¡x
4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game 128
¦4.7 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria 130
4.7.1 Definitions 130
4.7.2 A Two-Period Example 132
4.7.3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games
with Many Players 133
4.8 Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria 134
Exercises 138
References 141
5 Repeated Games 145
5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions 146
5.1.1 The Model 146
5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games 150
5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set 160
5.2 Finitely Repeated Games 165
5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents 168
5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 168
5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players 171
5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents 172
5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in
Repeated Games 174
5.4.1 Introduction 174
5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games 176
5.4.3 Renegotiation-Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games 179
5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information 182
5.5.1 The Model 183
5.5.2 Trigger-Price Strategies 185
5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria 187
5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation 188
5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 192
5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period 197
Exercises 200
References 203
III Static Games of Incomplete Information 207
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium 209
6.1 Incomplete Information 209
6.2 Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete
Information 211
6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy 213
Contents
6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium 215
6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria 215
6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies 226
6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance 226
6.6.2 Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance 228
6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria 230
6.7.1 Examples 230
6.7.2 Purification Theorem 233
6.8 The Distributional Approach 234
Exercises 237
References 241
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design 243
7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design 246
7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing 246
7.1.2 Auctions 250
7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle 253
7.3 Mechanism Design with a Single Agent 258
7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Allocations 258
7.3.2 Optimal Mechanisms 262
7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations,
Budget Balance, and Efficiency 268
7.4.1 Feasibility under Budget Balance 269
7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms 270
7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems 271
7.4.4 Inefficiency Theorems 275
7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems 279
7.4.6 Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems 281
7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization 284
7.5.1 Auctions 284
7.5.2 Efficient Bargaining Processes 288
7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design 292
7.6.1 Correlated Types 292
7.6.2 Risk Aversion 295
7.6.3 Informed Principal 297
7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design 299
7.6.5 Common Agency 301
Appendix 303
Exercises 308
References 314
Contents x¡
IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 319
8 Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and
Trembling-Hand Perfection 321
8.1 Introduction 321
8.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of
Incomplete Information 324
8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game 324
8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games 326
8.2.3 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and
Incomplete Information 331
8.3 Extensive-Form Refinements 336
8.3.1 Review of Game Trees 336
8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium 337
8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium 341
8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium 345
8.4 Strategic-Form Refinements 350
8.4.1 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium 351
8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium 356
Appendix 359
Exercises 360
References 364
9 Reputation Effects 367
9.1 Introduction 367
9.2 Games with a Single Long-Run Player 369
9.2.1 The Chain-Store Game 369
9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player:
The General Case 374
9.2.3 Extensive-Form Stage Games 381
9.3 Games with Many Long-Run Players 384
9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations 384
9.3.2 Common-Interest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations 386
9.4 A Single Big Player against Many Simultaneous Long-
Lived Opponents 389
Exercises 391
References 394
xjj Contents
10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information 397
10.1 Introduction 397
10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model 400
10.2.1 The Framework 400
10.2.2 A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics 402
10.2.3 An Infinite-Horizon Example oftheCoase Conjecture 405
10.2.4 The Skimming Property 406
10.2.5 The Gap Case 408
10.2.6 The No-Gap Case 411
10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale
Model 414
10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or
Repeated-Sale Model 416
10.3.1 Short-Term Contracts 417
10.3.2 Long-Term Contracts and Renegotiation 419
10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer 421
10.4.1 One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information 422
10.4.2 Alternating Offers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information 424
10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining 427
Exercises 428
References 432
V Advanced Topics 435
11 More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward
Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance 437
11.1 Strategic Stability 437
11.2 Signaling Games 446
11.3 Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and
Burning Money 460
11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty 467
Exercises 473
References 475
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games 479
12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria 479
12.1.1 Number of Nash Equilibria 479
12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations 480
12.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs 484
12.2.1 Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium 485
12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 487
Contents
12.3 Supermodular Games 489
Exercises 497
References 498
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium 501
13.1 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games 503
13.1.1 Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of Ì ÑÅ 503
13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games 505
13.1.3 Examples from Economics 507
13.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition
and Properties 513
13.2.1 Definition 513
13.2.2 Existence 515
13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations 518
13.3 Differential Games 520
13.3.1 Definition 520
13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions 521
13.3.3 Linear-Quadratic Differential Games 523
13.3.4 Technical Issues 525
13.3.5 Zero-Sum Differential Games 527
13.4 Capital-Accumulation Games 528
13.4.1 Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies 529
13.4.2 Differential-Game Strategies 534
Exercises 536
References 537
14 Common Knowledge and Games 541
14.1 Introduction 541
14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge 542
14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium 546
14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage 547
14.3.2 Agreeing to Disagree 548
14.3.3 No-Speculation Theorems 550
14.3.4 Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts 554
14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and
the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure 554
14.4.1 The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity 556
14.4.2 Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge 562
Exercises 570
References 571
Index 573
Titel: Game theory
Autor: Fudenberg, Drew
Jahr: 1992
Contents
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction xvii
I Static Games of Complete Information 1
1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium 3
1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance 4
1.1.1 Strategic-Form Games 4
1.1.2 Dominated Strategies 6
1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies 9
1.2 Nash Equilibrium 11
1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium 11
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria 14
1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium 16
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto
Optimality 18
1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or
Evolution 23
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria 29
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 29
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a
Closed Graph 30
1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games
with Continuous Payoffs 34
Exercises 36
References 42
2 Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium 45
2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability 45
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and
Properties 45
2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance 47
2.1.3 Rationalizability 48
2.1.4 Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance 50
2.1.5 Discussion 53
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium 53
2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria 59
Exercises 60
References 63
viii Contents
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information 65
3 Extensive-Form Games 67
3.1 Introduction 67
3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with 70
Observed Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game? 70
3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 72
3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and Time Consistency 74
3.3 The Extensive Form 77
3.3.1 Definition 77
3.3.2 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions 82
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games 83
3.4.1 Behavior Strategies 83
3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-
Form Games 85
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall 87
3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium 90
3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 92
3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 96
3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction 97
3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection 99
Exercises 100
References 105
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed
Actions 107
4.1 Introduction 107
4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection 108
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games 110
4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma 110
4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria 112
4.4 The Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining Model 113
4.4.1 A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 113
4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium 115
4.4.3 Comparative Statics 116
4.5 Simple Timing Games 117
4.5.1 Definition of Simple Timing Games 117
4.5.2 The War of Attrition 120
4.5.3 Preemption Games 126
Contents ¡x
4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game 128
¦4.7 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria 130
4.7.1 Definitions 130
4.7.2 A Two-Period Example 132
4.7.3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games
with Many Players 133
4.8 Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria 134
Exercises 138
References 141
5 Repeated Games 145
5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions 146
5.1.1 The Model 146
5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games 150
5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set 160
5.2 Finitely Repeated Games 165
5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents 168
5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 168
5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players 171
5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents 172
5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in
Repeated Games 174
5.4.1 Introduction 174
5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games 176
5.4.3 Renegotiation-Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games 179
5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information 182
5.5.1 The Model 183
5.5.2 Trigger-Price Strategies 185
5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria 187
5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation 188
5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 192
5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period 197
Exercises 200
References 203
III Static Games of Incomplete Information 207
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium 209
6.1 Incomplete Information 209
6.2 Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete
Information 211
6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy 213
Contents
6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium 215
6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria 215
6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies 226
6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance 226
6.6.2 Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance 228
6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria 230
6.7.1 Examples 230
6.7.2 Purification Theorem 233
6.8 The Distributional Approach 234
Exercises 237
References 241
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design 243
7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design 246
7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing 246
7.1.2 Auctions 250
7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle 253
7.3 Mechanism Design with a Single Agent 258
7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Allocations 258
7.3.2 Optimal Mechanisms 262
7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations,
Budget Balance, and Efficiency 268
7.4.1 Feasibility under Budget Balance 269
7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms 270
7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems 271
7.4.4 Inefficiency Theorems 275
7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems 279
7.4.6 Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems 281
7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization 284
7.5.1 Auctions 284
7.5.2 Efficient Bargaining Processes 288
7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design 292
7.6.1 Correlated Types 292
7.6.2 Risk Aversion 295
7.6.3 Informed Principal 297
7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design 299
7.6.5 Common Agency 301
Appendix 303
Exercises 308
References 314
Contents x¡
IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 319
8 Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and
Trembling-Hand Perfection 321
8.1 Introduction 321
8.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of
Incomplete Information 324
8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game 324
8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games 326
8.2.3 Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and
Incomplete Information 331
8.3 Extensive-Form Refinements 336
8.3.1 Review of Game Trees 336
8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium 337
8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium 341
8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium 345
8.4 Strategic-Form Refinements 350
8.4.1 Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium 351
8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium 356
Appendix 359
Exercises 360
References 364
9 Reputation Effects 367
9.1 Introduction 367
9.2 Games with a Single Long-Run Player 369
9.2.1 The Chain-Store Game 369
9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player:
The General Case 374
9.2.3 Extensive-Form Stage Games 381
9.3 Games with Many Long-Run Players 384
9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations 384
9.3.2 Common-Interest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations 386
9.4 A Single Big Player against Many Simultaneous Long-
Lived Opponents 389
Exercises 391
References 394
xjj Contents
10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information 397
10.1 Introduction 397
10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model 400
10.2.1 The Framework 400
10.2.2 A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics 402
10.2.3 An Infinite-Horizon Example oftheCoase Conjecture 405
10.2.4 The Skimming Property 406
10.2.5 The Gap Case 408
10.2.6 The No-Gap Case 411
10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale
Model 414
10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination: The Rental or
Repeated-Sale Model 416
10.3.1 Short-Term Contracts 417
10.3.2 Long-Term Contracts and Renegotiation 419
10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer 421
10.4.1 One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information 422
10.4.2 Alternating Offers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information 424
10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining 427
Exercises 428
References 432
V Advanced Topics 435
11 More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward
Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance 437
11.1 Strategic Stability 437
11.2 Signaling Games 446
11.3 Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and
Burning Money 460
11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty 467
Exercises 473
References 475
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games 479
12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria 479
12.1.1 Number of Nash Equilibria 479
12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations 480
12.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs 484
12.2.1 Existence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium 485
12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 487
Contents
12.3 Supermodular Games 489
Exercises 497
References 498
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium 501
13.1 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games 503
13.1.1 Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of Ì ÑÅ 503
13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games 505
13.1.3 Examples from Economics 507
13.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition
and Properties 513
13.2.1 Definition 513
13.2.2 Existence 515
13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations 518
13.3 Differential Games 520
13.3.1 Definition 520
13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions 521
13.3.3 Linear-Quadratic Differential Games 523
13.3.4 Technical Issues 525
13.3.5 Zero-Sum Differential Games 527
13.4 Capital-Accumulation Games 528
13.4.1 Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies 529
13.4.2 Differential-Game Strategies 534
Exercises 536
References 537
14 Common Knowledge and Games 541
14.1 Introduction 541
14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge 542
14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium 546
14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage 547
14.3.2 Agreeing to Disagree 548
14.3.3 No-Speculation Theorems 550
14.3.4 Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts 554
14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and
the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure 554
14.4.1 The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity 556
14.4.2 Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge 562
Exercises 570
References 571
Index 573
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170071790 (DE-588)11488014X |
| author_facet | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- |
| author_variant | d f df j t jt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV004825766 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB144 |
| callnumber-raw | HB144.F83 1991 |
| callnumber-search | HB144.F83 1991 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 3144 F83 41991 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| classification_rvk | SK 860 QH 430 |
| classification_tum | MAT 920f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)246833220 (DE-599)BVBBV004825766 |
| dewey-full | 519.3 658.4/035320 |
| dewey-hundreds | 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 519.3 658.4/0353 20 |
| dewey-search | 519.3 658.4/0353 20 |
| dewey-sort | 3519.3 |
| dewey-tens | 510 - Mathematics 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 2. print. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV004825766 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T08:23:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262061414 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-002968887 |
| oclc_num | 246833220 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-706 DE-188 DE-945 DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-706 DE-188 DE-945 DE-11 |
| physical | XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1992 |
| publishDateSearch | 1992 |
| publishDateSort | 1992 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- Game theory Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4132280-0 |
| title | Game theory |
| title_auth | Game theory |
| title_exact_search | Game theory |
| title_full | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_fullStr | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_short | Game theory |
| title_sort | game theory |
| topic | Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Game theory Economics, Mathematical Spieltheorie Ökonometrie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002968887&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002968887&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fudenbergdrew gametheory AT tirolejean gametheory |