Game theory:
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
1991
|
| Subjects: | |
| Links: | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002890832&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| Item Description: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| Physical Description: | XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262061414 9780262061414 |
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MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Fudenberg, Drew |d 1957- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)170071790 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Game theory |c Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] |b MIT Press |c 1991 | |
| 300 | |a XXIII, 579 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Jeux, Théorie des | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathématiques économiques | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Teoria Dos Jogos |2 larpcal | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics, Mathematical | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
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| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Ökonometrie |0 (DE-588)4132280-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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Record in the Search Index
| _version_ | 1819269825060405248 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Acknowledgments
xv
Introduction
xvii
I Static Games of Complete Information
1
1
Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
3
1.1
Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance
4
1.1.1
Strategic-Form Games
4
1.1.2
Dominated Strategies
б
1.1.3
Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies
9
1.2
Nash Equilibrium
11
1.2.1
Definition of Nash Equilibrium
11
1.2.2
Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
14
1.2.3
Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
16
1.2.4
Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Pomts, and Pareto
Optimality
18
1.2.5
Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or
Evolution
23
1.3
Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
29
1.3.1
Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
29
1.3.2
The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a
Closed Graph
30
1.3.3
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games
with Continuous Payoffs
34
Exercises
36
References
42
2
Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium
45
2.1
Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
45
2.1.1
Iterated Strict Dominance:
Definition
and
Properties
45
2.1.2
An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance
47
2.1.3
Rationalizability
48
2.1.4
Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance
50
2.1.5
Discussion
53
2.2
Correlated Equilibrium
53
2,3
Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
59
Exercises
60
References
63
Contents
viii
65
3
Extensive-Form Games
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information
67
3.1
Introduction
3.2
Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with
70
Observed Actions
3.2.1
What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
3.2.2
Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
72
3.2.3
The Value of Commitment and Time Consistency
74
3.3
The Extensive Form
^7
3.3.1
Definition 77
3.3.2
Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
82
3.4
Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
83
3.4.1
Behavior Strategies
83
3.4.2
The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-
Form Games
85
3.4.3
The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall
87
3.4.4
Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
90
3.5 Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
92
3.6
Critiques of Backward Induction and
Subgame
Perfection
96
3.6.1
Critiques of Backward Induction
97
3.6.2
Critiques of
Subgame
Perfection
99
Exercises
100
References
105
4
Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed
Actions
107
4.1
Introduction
107
4.2
The Principle of Optimally and
Subgame
Perfection
108
4.3
A First Look at Repeated Games
110
4.3.1
The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
110
4.3.2
A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria
И2
4.4
The Rubinstem-StAhl Bargaining Model
Ш
4.4.1
A Subgaroe-Perfect Equilibrium
113
4.4.2
Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium
115
4.43
Comparative Statics
4-5
Simple Timing Games
4.5.1
Definition of Simple Timing Games
4SI
The War of Attrition
4-SJ Preemption Games
Contents jx
4.6
Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game
128
4.7
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria
130
4.7.1
Definitions
130
4.7.2
A Two-Period Example
132
4.7.3
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games
with Many Players
133
4.8
Finite-Horizon and Infinite-Horizon Equilibria
134
Exercises
138
References
141
5
Repeated Games
145
5.1
Repeated Games with Observable Actions
146
5.1.1
The Model
146
5.1.2
The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games
150
5.1.3
Characterization of the Equilibrium Set
160
5.2
Finitely Repeated Games
165
5.3
Repeated Games with Varying Opponents
168
5.3.1
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
168
5.3.2
Games with Overlapping Generations of Players
171
5.3.3
Randomly Matched Opponents
172
5.4
Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in
Repeated Games
174
5.4.1
Introduction
174
5.4.2
Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games
176
5.4.3
Renegotiation-Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games
179
5.5
Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
182
5.5.1
The Model
183
5.5.2
Trigger-Price Strategies
185
5.5.3
Public Strategies and Public Equilibria
187
5.5.4
Dynamic Programming and Self-Generation
188
5.6
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
192
5.7
Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
197
Exercises
200
References
203
Ш
Static Games of Incomplete
Information
207
6
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
209
6.1
Incomplete Information
209
6.2
Example
6.1:
Providing a Public Good under Incomplete
Information
6.3
The
Nouons
of Type and Strategy
213
Contents
215
6.4 Bayesian
Equilibrium
6.5
Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria
215
6.6
Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
226
6.6.1
Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance
226
6.6.2
Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance
228
6.7
Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
230
6.7.1
Examples
230
6.7.2
Purification Theorem
233
6.8
The Distributional Approach
234
Exercises iJ
References
241
7
Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
243
7.1
Examples of Mechanism Design
246
7.1.1
Nonlinear Pricing
246
7.1.2
Auctions
250
7.2
Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle
253
7.3
Mechanism Design with a Single Agent
258
7.3.1
Implementable Decisions and Allocations
258
7.3.2
Optimal Mechanisms
262
7.4
Mechanisms with Several Agents: Feasible Allocations,
Budget Balance, and Efficiency
268
7.4.1
Feasibility under Budget Balance
269
7.4.2
Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms
270
7.4.3
Efficiency Theorems
271
7.4.4
Inefficiency Theorems
275
7.4.5
Efficiency Limit Theorems
279
7.4.6
Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems
281
7.5
Mechanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
284
7.5.1
Auctions
284
7.5.2
Efficient Bargaining Processes
288
7.6
Further Topics in Mechanism Design
292
7.6.1
Correlated Types
292
7.6.2
Risk Aversion
295
7.6.3
Informed Principal
297
7.6.4
Dynamic Mechanism Design
299
7.6.5
Common Agency 3qi
Appendix 303
308
314
Contents
Xl
IV
Dynamic Games
of Incomplete Information
319
8
Equilibrium Refinements: Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and
Trembling-Hand Perfection
321
8.1
Introduction
321
8.2
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games of
Incomplete Information
324
8.2.1
The Basic Signaling Game
324
8.2.2
Examples of Signaling Games
326
8.2.3
Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions and
Incomplete Information
331
8.3
Extensive-Form Refinements
336
8.3.1
Review of Game Trees
336
8.3.2
Sequential Equilibrium
337
8.3.3
Properties of Sequential Equilibrium
341
8.3.4
Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium
345
8.4
Strategic-Form Refinements
350
8.4.1
Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium
351
8.4.2
Proper Equilibrium
356
Appendix
359
Exercises
360
References
364
9
Reputation Effects
367
9.1
Introduction
367
9.2
Games with a Single Long-Run Player
369
9.2.1
The Chain-Store Game
369
9.2.2
Reputation Effects with a Single Long-Run Player.
The General Case
374
9.2.3
Extensive-Form
Suge
Games
381
9.3
Games with Many Long-Run Players
384
9.3.1
General Stage Games and General Reputations
384
9.3.2
Common-Interest Games and Bounded-Recall Reputations
386
9.4
A Single Big Player against Many Simultaneous Long-
Lived Opponents
389
Exercises
391
References
394
Contents
Ili
10
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Infonnation
397
•3Q7
10.1
Introduction
10.2
Intertemporal
Price Discrimination: The Single-Sale Model
400
10.2.1
The Framework
40°
10.2.2
A Two-Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics
402
10.2.3
An Infinite-Horizon Example of the
Coase
Conjecture
405
10.2.4
The Skimming Property 4°6
10.2.5
The Gap Case
^08
10.2.6
The No-Gap Case
411
10.Z7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single-Sale
Model 414
10.3
Intertemporal
Price Discrimination: The Rental or
Repeated-Sale Model
416
10.3.1
Short-Term Contracts
417
10.3.2
Long-Term
Contracts and Renegotiation
419
10.4
Price Offers by an Informed Buyer
421
10.4.1
One-Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information
422
10.4.2
Alternating Offers and One-Sided Asymmetric Information
424
10.4.3
Mechanism Design and Bargaining
427
Exercises
428
References
432
V Advaaced Topics
435
11
More Equilibrium Refinements: Stability, Forward
Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance
437
11.1
Strategic Stability
437
1
1.2
Signaling Games
445
1
1.3
Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and
Burning Money
460
11.4
Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty
467
Exercises 473
References 475
12
Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games
479
111 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria
479
12.1.1
Number of Nash Equilibria 479
!
Robustocss of Eq^bria to Payoff Perturbations
480
Ш
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with
Отшшоиѕ
Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs
484
■ 2L2,1 Existence nf a I>..M
c*_.
___«- .....
j a wt
------—
«wej Equilibrium
435
of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
487
Contents
12.3 Supermodular Games 489
Exercises
497
References
49g
13
Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
501
13.1
Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games
503
13.1.1
Stochastic Games: Definition and Existence of
Μ Ρ Ε
503
13.1.2
Separable Sequential Games
505
13.1.3
Examples from Economics
507
13.2
Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games: Definition
and Properties
513
13.2.1
Definition
513
13.2.2
Existence
515
13.2.3
Robustness to Payoff Perturbations
518
13.3
Differential Games
520
13.3.1
Definition
520
13.3.2
Equilibrium Conditions
521
13.3.3
Linear-Quadratic Differentia] Games
523
13.3.4
Technical Issues
525
13.3.5
Zero-Sum Differential Games
527
13.4
Capital-Accumulation Games
528
13.4.1
Open-Loop, Closed-Loop, and Markov Strategies
529
13.4.2
Differential-Game Strategies
534
Exercises
536
References
537
14
Common Knowledge and Games
541
14.1
Introduction
541
14.2
Knowledge and Common Knowledge
542
14.3
Common Knowledge and Equilibrium
546
14.3.1
The Dirty Faces and the Sage
547
14.3.2
Agreeing to Disagree
548
14.3.3
No-Speculation Theorems
550
14.3.4
Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts
554
14.4
Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and
the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure
554
14.4.1
The Lack of Lower Hemi-Continuity
556
14.4.2
Lower Hemi-Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge
562
Exercises
570
References
571
Index
573
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170071790 (DE-588)11488014X |
| author_facet | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- |
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| author_sort | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- |
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| bvnumber | BV004705179 |
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| callnumber-sort | HB 3144 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| classification_rvk | QH 430 SK 860 CC 3200 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)23180038 (DE-599)BVBBV004705179 |
| dewey-full | 658.4/0353 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4/0353 |
| dewey-search | 658.4/0353 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4 3353 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Mathematik Philosophie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV004705179 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T08:21:39Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262061414 9780262061414 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-002890832 |
| oclc_num | 23180038 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-20 DE-29 DE-N2 DE-706 DE-83 DE-634 DE-11 DE-188 DE-521 DE-945 DE-29T DE-703 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-20 DE-29 DE-N2 DE-706 DE-83 DE-634 DE-11 DE-188 DE-521 DE-945 DE-29T DE-703 |
| physical | XXIII, 579 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 1991 |
| publishDateSearch | 1991 |
| publishDateSort | 1991 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spellingShingle | Fudenberg, Drew 1957- Tirole, Jean 1953- Game theory Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Teoria Dos Jogos larpcal Economics, Mathematical Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4132280-0 |
| title | Game theory |
| title_auth | Game theory |
| title_exact_search | Game theory |
| title_full | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_fullStr | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory Drew Fudenberg ; Jean Tirole |
| title_short | Game theory |
| title_sort | game theory |
| topic | Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Teoria Dos Jogos larpcal Economics, Mathematical Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Ökonometrie (DE-588)4132280-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Teoria Dos Jogos Economics, Mathematical Game theory Spieltheorie Ökonometrie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=002890832&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fudenbergdrew gametheory AT tirolejean gametheory |