Suchergebnisse - Mailath, George J.

Repeated games and reputations: long-run relationships

von Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry 1953-

Inhaltsverzeichnis

When do regulators close banks: when should they?

von Mailath, George J., Mester, Loretta J.

Correlated equilibria as network equilibria

von Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry 1953-, Shaked, Avner

A positive analysis of bank closure

von Mailath, George J., Mester, Loretta J.

When do regulators close banks: when should they

von Mailath, George J., Mester, Loretta J.

When the punishment must fit the crime: remarks on the failure of simple penal codes in extensive-form games

von Mailath, George J., Nocke, Volker, White, Lucy 1972-

Structural indifference in normal form games

von Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry 1953-, Swinkels, Jeroen M.